绩效评价外文翻译---公共部门中的绩效悖论(编辑修改稿)

绩效评价外文翻译---公共部门中的绩效悖论(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

he organization that implements the policy. The contracts articulate which task has to be carried out and what the executive agent will receive as a reward. The agent39。 s performance is expressed in terms of performance indicators, such as the number of goods or services rendered. Input management is thus replaced by a resultsbased orientation. Similar changes took place within government bureaucracy as well, where self management and contract management were introduced to (partly) replace hierarchical steering. The aforementioned changes in the public sector led to the adoption of a large number of private sector techniques to measure and improve performance, such as performance indicators. Not only do indicators enable politicians to measure and evaluate the performance of public and private policyimplementing organizations, they also increase the opportunities to account for performance—another important goal of administrative reform (Jenkins, Leeuw, amp。 Van Thiel, in press). Obviously, all these changes were fed by a strong belief in the measurability of performance in the public sector. However, as we shall argue below, that belief may have been somewhat 外文翻译 稿和原稿 48 simplistic (cf. Fountain, 2020). The Performance Paradox The performance paradox refers to a weak correlation between performance indicators and performance itself (Meyer amp。 Gupta, 1994。 Meyer amp。 O39。 Shaughnessy, 1993). This phenomenon is caused by the tendency of performance indicators to run down over time. They lose their value as measurements of performance and can no longer discriminate between good and bad performers. As a result, the relationship between actual and reported performance declines. Deterioration of performance indicators is caused by four processes (Meyer amp。 Gupta, 1994, pp. 330342). The first process is called positive learning。 that is, as performance improves, indicators lose their sensitivity in detecting bad performance. In fact, everybody has bee so good at what they do that the indicator bees obsolete. The second process is called perverse learning. When organizations or individuals have learned which aspects of performance are measured (and which are not), they can use that information to manipulate their assessments. For example, by primarily putting all the efforts into what is measured, performance will go up. However, overall there may be no actual improvement or perhaps even a deterioration of (other aspects of) performance (cf. tunnel vision) (Smith, 1995). The third process, selection, refers to the replacement of poor performers with better performers, which reduces differences in performance. Only good performers remain, and the indicator loses its discriminating valuealmost resembling a consequence of the survival of the fittest mechanism. And fourth, suppression occurs when differences in performance are ignored (see below for an example). It is important to understand that the paradox is not about performance itself but about the reports on performance. Contrary to the expectation, indicators do not give an accurate report of performance. This could mean that performance is worse than reported (overrepresentation) but also that it is better than reported (underrepresentation). In the latter case, the performance paradox might be considered harmless. However, when the results of performance assessment are used to evaluate organizations or persons, situations can arise where these are unjustly sanctioned. The percentage of crimes solved is decreasing, indicating that the police39。 s performance is deteriorating. However, during the time period studied, more perpetrators have been arrested, prosecuted, and penalized than before, which would 外文翻译 稿和原稿 49 indicate an improvement of performance. Wiebrens and Essers (1999) show that crime patterns in the Netherlands have developed in a way that invalidates the (internationally wellestablished) indicator. For one, crime has bee more violent, but the indicator does not differentiate between, for example, felonies and misdemeanors. Moreover, more groups of criminals have been arrested mitting a crime together such as vandalism, which reduces the average number of crimes per criminal. Wiebrens and Essers conclude that it is not the police that are performing badly but the indicator and that it therefore should be replaced. An exampl。