污染控制与墨西哥吸收外商直接投资：一个产业层面的分析外文翻译(编辑修改稿)

污染控制与墨西哥吸收外商直接投资：一个产业层面的分析外文翻译(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

990s from only a few per year to several thousand (Dasgupta et al. 2020). As far as pliance is concerned, in a confidential survey of 236 Mexican plants in the fall of 1995, Dasgupta et al. (2020) found that 52% of survey respondents admitted only occasional or no pliance with environmental regulations. See also Lucas et al. (1992), Hettige et al. (1996), and Mani and Wheeler (1998).Pollution Control and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico 291regulations of both developed and developing countries (Eskeland and Harrison 2020). When economywide data are used, the position of GDP may change over time, thus attributing changes in pollution output to changes in environmental stringency instead of this position effect. Finally, when many unobserved characteristics of industry, such as the labor intensity of production, are not controlled for in empirical analyses, the resulting estimates are likely to be biased. Another reason why developing countries do not tend to bee pollution havens may be that the stringency of a country’s environmental standards is only one, and perhaps not the most important, factor determining parative advantage among countries (Ederington et al. 2020). In particular, endowment of factors such as skilled labor and capital largely determine where industry is located and which goods a country will export. To the extent that heavily polluting industries also tend to be capitalintensive, the relative paucity of capital in developing countries may outweigh their abatement cost advantage (Antweiler et 4 al. 2020。 Cole and Elliott 2020). This study contributes to the literature on the existence of pollution havens in several ways. First, we use pollution intensities, which follow directly from emission control, as a measure of the stringency of environmental standards (Xing and Kolstad 2020). The focus on pollution intensity is useful since it allows for substitution between capital and pollution and does not require data on unobservable pollution taxes. It is also consistent with actual US policy, which does not impose taxes but rather regulates emissions directly by setting distinct limits that plants must attain (Kunce and Shogren 2020).3 Second, we focus on FDI rather than trade since we consider a developing host country, Mexico, which tests the hypothesis that firms invest there to take advantage of environmental standards which are less strict. Conclusion This study has tested for and quantified a pollution haven effect for the case of Mexico. We investigate whether FDI flows into Mexico are indeed affected by the pollution intensity of production. In spite of recent improvements in laws and enforcement in the wake of NAFTA, loose。