最优资本结构对经济及其它价值的作用外文翻译(编辑修改稿)

最优资本结构对经济及其它价值的作用外文翻译(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

may lose jobs and the economy can be disrupted. Because of the costs they potentially bear in the event of a firm’s financial distress, nonfinancial stakeholders will be less interested ceteris paribus in doing business with a firm having a high(er) potential for financial difficulties. This understandable reluctance to do business with a distressed firm creates a cost that can deter a firm from undertaking excessive debt financing even when lenders are willing to provide it on favorable terms. These considerations by nonfinancial stakeholders are the cause of their importance as determinant for the capital structure. This stakeholder theory could be seen as part of the tradeoff theory ， since these stakeholders influence the indirect costs of financial distress. As the tradeoff theory (excluding agency costs between managers and shareholders) and the pecking order theory, the stakeholder theory of Grinblatt and Titman assumes shareholder wealth maximization as the single corporate objective. Based on these theories, a huge number of empirical studies have been produced. See . Harris and Raviv or a systematic overview of this literature. More recent studies are . Sunder and Myers, testing the tradeoff theory against the pecking order theory, Kemsley and Nissim estimating the present value of tax shields, Andrade and Kaplan estimating the costs of financial distress and Rajan and Zingales investigating the determinants of capital structure in the G7 countries. Rajan and Zingales explain differences in leverage of individual firms with firm characteristics. In their study leverage is a function of tangibility of assets, markettobook ratio, firm size and profitability. Barclay and Smith provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Cross sectional studies as by Titman and Wessels , Rajan and Zingales ,Barclay and Smith and Wald model capital structure mainly in terms of leverage and then leverage as a function of different firm (and market) characteristics as suggested by capital structure theory. We do the opposite. We do not analyze the effect of several firm characteristics on capital structure, but we analyze the effect of capital structure on variables that codetermine shareholder value. In several decisions, including capital structure decisions, these variables may get the role of decision criteria. Other Objectives and Considerations A lot of evidence suggests that managers act not only in the interest of the shareholders. Neither the static tradeoff theory nor the pecking order theory can fully explain differences in capital structure. Myers [41] () states that “Yet even 40 years after the Modigliani and Miller research, our understanding of these firms financing choices is limited.”Results of several surveys reveal that CFOs do not pay a lot of attention to variables relevant in these shareholder wealth maximizing theories. Given the results of empirical research, this does not e as a surprise. The survey by Graham and Harvey finds only moderate evidence for the tradeoff theory. Around 70% have a flexible target or a somewhat tight target or range. Only 10% have a strict target ratio. Around 20% of the firms declare not to have an optimal or target debtequity ratio at all. In general, the corporate tax advantage seems only moderately important in capital structure decisions. The tax advantage of debt is most important for large regulated and dividend paying firms. Further, favorable foreign tax treatment relative to the . is fairly important in issuing foreign debt decisions. Little evidence is found that personal taxes influence the capital structure. In general potential costs of financial distress seem not very important although credit ratings are. According to Graham and Harvey this last finding could be。