外文资料翻译--绿色营销的博弈分析及对策探讨(编辑修改稿)

外文资料翻译--绿色营销的博弈分析及对策探讨(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

n is pletely open， that is， the enterprises involved in game are conversant with the characteristics， business strategy and market power mutually，yet before making decisions， the enterprises involved in game do not know actions each other，and the game among them is a kind of static game． The behaviors adopted by the enterprises in market petition have no governmental intervention and policy guidance． The market of green products is still in the early stage of market development。 consumers39。 awareness of green concept is weak。 the level of consumption of green products is relatively low． In the mean time，the capacity of whole market is certain， but the degrees of demand for different products ( nongreen products and green products) are not the same． Under the same kind of marketing strategy， the increment of product prices， unit costs， and variable costs of the enterprises involved in game is basically the same． .Game model analysis .Game among enterprises The enterprises involved in game are assumed as a kind of rational economic man， and at the moment， the pursuit of profit maximization is the original Asian Agricultural Research 2020 3(7): 5 － 9 Research on Agricultural Macro Economy power for survival and development of enterprises． In the market petition， the enterprises should take seeking profit maximization as the fundamental goal of themselves． The main basis and principles of all business decisions of enterprises are centered on profit maximization． I analyze the process of game among different types of enterprises in green marketing respectively as follows． . between enterprises implementing green marketing and enterprises not implementing green marketing. Because green food and green marketing in China have not yet been implemented for so long， and the relevant governmental departments have not yet taken effective surveillance measures on the production of green food and green marketing， so many enterprises have not yet established the idea of production of green marketing， and the majority of consumers39。 concept and awareness of green consumption are still very weak． Meanwhile， the cost of producing green products is higher than that of nongreen products for enterprises． If the consumer demand of green products in market is short， and the level of green consumption is relatively low， producing green products by enterprises may lead to negative profits， so that the enterprises are caught in prisoner39。 s dilemma ． For example， assuming that the market has Enterprise A and Enterprise B， and assuming that they are both rational economic man， with the main objective of seeking profit maximization． If Enterprise A and Enterprise B both implement traditional marketing and do not produce green products， then the profit they obtain is 0。 if Enterprise B implements traditional marketing， then the profit is 0， and if Enterprise A implements green marketing， its profit is － 45。 if Enterprise A adopts traditional marketing， its profit is 0， while Enterprise B adopts green marketing， its profit is － 45。 if Enterprise A and Enterprise B both adopt green marketing， their profit is － 25． Therefore， no matter whether Enterprise A adopts green marketing， the optimal choice of Enterprise B is traditional marketing． In the same way， no matter whether Enterprise B adopts green marketing， the optimal choice of Enterprise A is also traditional marketing． Therefore，according to the principle of pursuit of profit maximization， Enterprise A and Enterprise B will eventually opt for traditional marketing． The matrix of corresponding choices and profit of Enterprise A and Enterprise B can be seen in the Table ． Table Game between green marketing and traditional marketing A Adopting B Adopting green marketing traditional marketing A Adopting green marketing － 25，－ 25 － 45， 0 B Adopting traditional marketing 0，－ 45 0， 0 . Game between true green marketing and false green marketing. Assuming that in the market， there are some enterprises with counterfeit green products and fake green marketing， and they obtain more profits from the market via counterfeit green products． Because green marketing enterprises need to bear certain outlay on research，development， marketing and publicity， so that the consumers choose and accept green products， and increase purchase volume， thus the production of green products will have relatively high profit margin． Assuming that the total cost of producing and developing green products for enterprise is 1 million yuan， and the profit margin of enterprises is 40%， then the profit of enterprise is 0． 4 million yuan． Assuming that the cost of producing nongreen traditional products for enterprise is only 0． 5 million yuan， and the profit margin after adopting traditional marketing is 18%， then the profit of enterprise is 90 000 yuan． If the enterprises which produce counterfeit green products enter the market， given that the counterfeiting process will also increase part of the cost of counterfeiting， its cost increases from 0． 5 million yuan to 0． 6 million yuan， with profit of 0． 4 million yuan， then the profit margin is 66%． That is to say， the fake green marketing enterprises share part of the profits that the green marketing enterprises should obtain． This game model is that Enterprise A implements green marketing， and Enterprise B adopts green marketing． The green marketing is the optim。