外文翻译--股利：源于金融危机的背景下美国银行控股公司的证据(编辑修改稿)

外文翻译--股利：源于金融危机的背景下美国银行控股公司的证据(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

To capture this effect, we included a dummy PCA in our model. This variable assumes a value of unity if a bank does not meet at least one of these thresholds. In total, the variable assumes a value of unity for 44 observations before the crisis and 73 observations during the crisis. Undercapitalized banks (banks subject to regulatory pressure) are expected to be associated with lower dividend , a negative relationship is expected between PCA and dividend payout. In order to test the hypothesis that undercapitalized banks faced greater regulatory pressure to plowback their earnings than wellcapitalized banks, we considered the interaction of PCA with profitability. With this variable, the relevance of profitability as a determinant of banks39。 dividend payout bees dependent on the level of capital. We present a summary of these variables in Table 2. Eq. (1) reflects all the considered variables with their respective hypothesized signs and relationships with the dependent variable. Dividendpayout=δ0+δ1size+δ2profitabilityδ3historicalgrowth177。 δ4expectedgrowth+δ5independence+δ8capitalizationδ9regulatorypressureδ10profitability* regulatorypressure+εit。 Eq. (1) We present the sample summary statistics in Table 3 and the correlation matrix in Table 4. Certain impacts of the financialcrisis are well reflected in the data: namely, the deterioration of profitability, historical growth and expected growth. Although the average capitalization level deteriorated only slightly (from a tier 1 leverage ratio of % to %), the number of banks facing increased regulatory pressure rose sharply (from 44 to 73 banks). The dividend payouts also deteriorated during the financial crisis. That is, the payouts decreased from an average of % of total assets before the crisis to % of total assets during the crisis. Table 2 Variables. 共 页 ， 第 6 页 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 装 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 订 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 线 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ This table describes the selected dependent and explanatory variables. Table 3 Sample summary statistics. This table presents the summary statistics for the selected dependent and independent variables. The variables are the same as those defined in Table 2. Table 4 Correlation matrix. 共 页 ， 第 7 页 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 装 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 订 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 线 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ This table presents the correlations between the selected variables. The variables are the same as those defined in Table 2. 4. Findings and discussion . Baseline We report all findings with robust standard errors because White39。 s test indicated the presence of heteroskedasticity in the data. Because the dependent variable (dividend payout) does not assume negative values, the distribution can be considered censored to the left, a situation in which OLS can produce inconsistent estimates (Wooldridge, 2020). While the issue in the sample is not severe, Eq. (1) was estimated with a TOBIT regression. We present the baseline findings of our model in Table 5, considering only capitalization to capture the effect of regulatory monitoring (column 1), and additionally PCA and its interaction with profitability (column 2) to capture the effect of regulatory pressure on undercapitalized banks. The findings indicate that the Fama and French (2020) characteristics of dividend 共 页 ， 第 8 页 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 装 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 订 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 线 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ payers can be applied to banks: size and profitability are positively and significantly related and historical growth is negatively related to dividend payout, . larger and more profitable banks paid larger dividend payouts, and banks with low historical growth opportunities also paid more dividends. These findings are consistentwith the findings of previous studies (Casey and Dickens, 2020。 Collins et al., 1994。 Dickens et al., 2020). Expected growth is positively and significantly related with dividend payout, which does not allow us to reject the signaling hypothesis. Therefore, our findings support the signaling argument that dividends work as a signal of future growth opportunities, consistent with the findings from Filbeck and Mullineaux (1993) and Bessler and Nohel (1996). Independence is positively and significantly related to dividend payout, . banks with dispersed shareholders pay out more dividends to balance the increased need for monitoring, which does not allow us to reject the agency cost hypothesis. As a result, and despite the presence of external regulators in the financial industry, the findings still support the agency argument that dividends pensate for the need for monitoring, as also observed by Casey and Dickens (2020) and Dickens et al. (2020). Table 5 Basline . Sample split The “ Chow test” for the periods before and during the financial crisis allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients were equal before and during the financial crisis. This finding supports the decision to analyze the two periods separately 共 页 ， 第 9 页 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 装 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 订 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 线 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ due to the distinct macroeconomic conditions and the major regulatory s。