外文翻译--公司特征与自愿性内部控制管理报告(编辑修改稿)内容摘要:

rk of Healy and Palepu 2020 who argue that the demand for disclosure arises from information asymmetry and agency costs between firm managers and outside investors. A naturally occurring research question arising from this theoretical framework involves examining the factors affecting management‟s disclosure choices. Voluntary disclosures are likely to be related to economic and governance characteristics of firms Healy and Palepu 2020 . In this study, we examine the relation between voluntary inclusion of an MRIC in the annual report and firm economic and governance characteristics. Firm Characteristics Firm size is positively related to lawsuits alleging financial reporting and disclosure problems ., Carcello and Palmrose 1994。 Palmrose and Scholz 2020 . Since the potential litigationrelated exposure from issuing a misleading MRIC is greater for larger firms, the issuance of an MRIC for larger firms is a more credible signal. We therefore expect a positive relation between firm size and an MRIC. Prior research finds that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely when controls are weak Beasley 1996。 Beasley et al. 1999 . An MRIC provides a means by which firms with strong internal control, but with other firm characteristics that are associated with a higher incidence of fraud, can signal to external parties their financial reporting quality. Firms with greater leverage and firms that issue securities are more likely to mit fraud Dechow et al. 1996 . Thus, including an MRIC provides panies with such characteristics a way to municate information about the reliability of their financial information. We therefore expect a positive relation between firm leverage and the issuance of securities and an MRIC. There is increasing evidence that audit mittee characteristics are related to better financial reporting and auditing quality ., Carcello and Neal 2020。 Klein 2020。 Abbott et al. 2020 . Since strong internal controls are expected to improve the reliability of financial reporting Public Oversight Board [POB] 1993。 Nicolaisen 2020 , better governed firms are likely to have better internal controls and these firms may seek to signal this fact to the capital markets by voluntarily issuing an MRIC. We measure audit mittee independence,financial expertise, and diligence, and we expect independent audit mittees, audit mittees with higher proportions of financial experts, and audit mittees that meet more frequently to be more concerned about the quality of the firm‟s internal control a result, we expect a positive relation between these three governance factors and the inclusion of an MRIC. SAMPLE Our sample is from the period preceding both SOX and the Report of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees BRC 1999 . The BRC Report spurred a heightened interest in corporate governance and might have precipitated panies to include an MRIC in their annual reports due to external pressures. The reaction of registrants to SEC and other quasiregulatory initiatives is interesting but differs from the focus of this paper. We are interested in the relation between firm characteristics and voluntary disclosure that existed before the issuance of the BRC Report. We select our sample from the population of firms with 1998 fiscal yearend data included on the July 1999 Compact D/SEC disc. There are approximately 11,900 panies included on this disc that have a 1998 yearend. We exclude panies with over $5 billion in total assets because prior research indicates that a substantial majority of very large panies include an MRIC in their annual report Raghunandan and Rama 1994 . We also exclude panies with less than $250 million in assets as prior research indicates that very small panies rarely include an MRIC McMullen。
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