外文翻译---汇率制度透析(编辑修改稿)

外文翻译---汇率制度透析(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

shocks occur in the United States. (In fact, many economists argue that those shocks have bee so important, with empirical money demand functions breaking down, that statistics on moary aggregates have bee nearly useless for moary policy.) Yet the Fed has not encountered major difficulties in shortrun stabilization in the 1990s. Why not? Because shortrun Fed policy actions focus on targeting a nominal interest rate, and this, like a fixed exchange rate system, allows the Fed to furnish “an elastic currency” with the money supply responding automatically to money demand shocks. The point is not whether this method works perfectly, or whether it is desirable— the point is that there are policy alternatives that render unimportant the conclusions of those models that one exchange rate system is better under certain conditions, 4 while another is better under other conditions. Without an extended analysis that considers all such options, the policy conclusions of these models would be nearly useless even if the evidence supported their positive predictions. The Issue of Transaction Costs Floating exchange rate systems entail transactions costs of changing currencies, and associated informationprocessing costs of figuring out how to translate prices from an unfamiliar currency into something that one can intuitively understand and place in perspective. However, these costs do not appear to be particularly large in parison either with the potential costs and benefits of the systems for other reasons (see below), or in parison to the costs of adding sales taxes (in the United States) or determining the relative merits of the 32oz size at $ or the 20oz size at $. Moreover, these costs have been falling over time since the advent of calculators made mental multiplication and division lessimportant tasks for everyday travelers, and they will continue to fall as new technologies provide and process information for us. Friedman’ s DaylightSavingTime Argument Friedman’s daylight savingtime argument is likely to involve larger costs and benefits. Just as it is easier to reset clocks than to reset the times of every daily activity, it is easier for the exchange rate to respond to changes in underlying conditions than for the overall nominal price level to respond, with all the acpanying real disruptions. The main objection to Friedman’s argument is that we do not know if the market response will “get it right” — will the exchange rate adjust to the new equilibrium level? The honest answer, of course, is “Who knows?” Economists don’t yet have a model of exchange rates with much 5 empirical support. But is no change at all in the exchange rate likely to be better? Again, no one really knows, and current evidence is vastly insufficient to provide a good answer. Whatever that answer, flexibility, such as labor mobility, capital mobility, financial mobility, absence of laws and regulations that hinder flexibility (such as laws making it difficult to fire people, or raising the costs of hiring new workers) has considerable benefits. The greater overall flexibility, the less likely any exchange rate system will have a major effect on human welfare, unless that system leads to a major crisis. Institutional and Political Economy Issues Since the middle of the 20th century, the focus of serious discussion on exchange rate systems has shifted from the issues outlined thus far to questions about credibility of moary (and other) policies, alternative mitment mechanisms for policymakers, the stability and strength of financial systems, and mechanismdesign issues— that is, the design of institutions and politicaleconomy issues. Some of the issues are old. Flexible exchange rates provide the option for a nation to pursue its own moary policies. Whether that option is a benefit or curse depends on factors such as how political forces operate within the nation’s institutions to affect its policies. The corresponding benefit of a fixed exchange rate system is that it constrains moary policy. Of course, if a nation wants constraints— and has the political will to impose them on itself— it has other options available that it could pursue under a system of floating exchange rates (such as constitutional rules on policy, institutional changes, and so on). A fixed exchange rate system (like these other options) may provide (future) mitment as well as a (current) constraint. However, there are many ways to mit. Certainly there is little reason to believe that a 6 policy of pegging the exchange rate is more credible than alternative institutional arrangements such as independent central banks, currency boards, payment systems that reward or penalize central bankers for economic outes, or constitutional requirements for centralbank actions or performance. Some of these may entail greater credibility than pe。