诺贝尔经济学奖经典理论—纳什均衡的ppt详解(ppt31)-经济理论(编辑修改稿)

诺贝尔经济学奖经典理论—纳什均衡的ppt详解(ppt31)-经济理论(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

(3) **( ) 39。 ( ) 0i i i i iv g g g v g g c    * * * * *1 1 1... ...i i i ng g g g g       n n*1( * ) 39。 ( * ) 0v G G v G cn  Cont’d In contrast, the social optimum should resolve FOC: (4) Comparing (3) and (4), we can see that Implications for social and economic systems (Coase Theorem) **Gm a x ( )G v G G c( * * ) * * 39。 ( * * ) 0v G G v G c  * * *GG2. Dynamic Games of Complete Information  Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information  Theory: Backward Induction Example: The Trust Game General features: (1) Player 1 chooses an action from the feasible set . (2) Player 2 observes and then chooses an action from the feasible set . (3) Payoffs are and . 1a 1A1a 2a2A1 1 2( , )u a a 2 1 2( , )u a aCont’d Backward Induction: Then “People think backwards” 2 2 1 2a r g m a x ( , )a u a a1 1 1 2 1a r g m a x ( , ( ) )a u a R a An example: Stackelberg Model of Duopoly Two firms quantity pete sequentially. Timing: (1) Firm 1 chooses a quantity。 (2) Firm 2 observes and then chooses a quantity ； (3) The payoff to firm is given by the profit function is the inverse demand function, , and is the constant marginal cost of production (fixed cost being zero). 1 0q 1q 2 0q ( , ) [ ( ) ]i i j iq q q P Q c i()P Q a Q 12Q q qcCont’d We solve this game with backward induction (provided that ). 2 2 1 2 2 1 2* 12 2 1a r g m a x ( , ) ( )()2q q q q a q q ca q cq R q      1q a cCont’d Now。