外文翻译---新公共化管理与政府质量(编辑修改稿)

外文翻译---新公共化管理与政府质量(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

elected officials. Public choice and principalagency theories provided the ideological justifications for taking action against what were perceived as selfserving bureaucrats (Boston 1996). Beyond theory and ideology, however, the practice of public administration by professional public servants in some jurisdictions, notably Australia, Britain and New Zealand, offered more than sufficient evidence to political leaders of a publicservice culture that gave only grudging acceptance, at best, to the capacity of elected politicians to determine what constituted the ‘public interest’ in public policy and administration. The Canadian case is of interest, I suggest, for several reasons. In parative perspective, Canada did not approach public management reform with much of an ideological perspective. When the Conservatives defeated the centrist Liberals in 1984, neither the new prime minister, Brian Mulroney, nor his leading ministers were hardcore neoconservatives in the Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher mold. At that time, and until the end of the Conservative government in 1993, the party was essentially a centrist party in the Canadian ‘brokerage’ party tradition. While important aspects of neoliberalism unfolded, especially under the umbrella of economic deregulation that came with a freetrade agreement with the United States, there were no major administrative reforms that were politically driven. Pragmatism prevailed (Gow 2020). As a result, the reforms initiated during this period were essentially undertakings of the professional publicservice leadership that sought to stay abreast with developments elsewhere. The scope and depth of these reforms were affected, however, by the extent to which ministers wanted to maintain an active involvement in administration (Aucoin 1995). By parison to developments elsewhere, Canadian ministers were less inclined to worry about the professional public service being unresponsive to their political direction. Noheless, the Mulroney regime saw an expansion in the number, roles and influence of ‘political staff’ appointed to ministers’ offices, most notably in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). These staff, who have grown continuously in number over the past four decades, are not public servants, although they are employed on the public payroll. Unlike public servants, who are appointed independently of ministers, political staff are appointed and dismissed at the discretion of ministers and, of course, they have no tenure beyond their ministers. And, in official constitutional doctrine, they have no separate authority to direct the public service. In the Canadian tradition, moreover, they are appointed almost exclusively from partisanpolitical circles and appointees rarely possess any public service experience. For all these reasons, the Canadian government did not go as far down the NPM road as its three major Westminster counterparts (Australia, Britain and New Zealand) in terms of such matters as ‘agencification,’ devolution, term contracts for executives, external recruitment, or contractingout. And, the reforms that did occur did not fundamentally transform the traditional administrative architecture. Throughout, there was retained, and even further developed: • an integrated public service, with the most senior levels drawn from the career public service and managed and deployed as a corporate executive resource。 • departmental organizations, structured hierarchically with the minister as political executive and bining public policy and operational/service delivery。