外文翻译---一个合理的公务员：在美国以宪法为基础的行政行为(编辑修改稿)

外文翻译---一个合理的公务员：在美国以宪法为基础的行政行为(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

n personal and official is often blurred and contested in court. For now it is sufficient to point out that by statutory law and mon law tradition, personal and official accountability are of different genre and require a separate analysis. Official responsibility Chapter 2 examined the constitutional standard of conduct expected of a reasonable public servant in his personal capacity. This chapter examines the constitutional standard of conduct expected of a reasonable public servant in his official capacity. The officialcapacity conduct is the conduct expected of the public servant as an agent or representative of the principal, that is, the government. The distinction between personalcapacity conduct and officialcapacity conductalthough not always easy to makeis of central importance to the study of legal accountability. As we have seen in chapter 2, the public servant has no right to misuse his power under color of law in violation of the Constitution and law. To the extent that he does, he is on his own, cannot expect taxpayers to cover his errant behavior, and is personally responsible for whatever torts he has mitted. For the interest of the public service and selfprotection, however, the mon law principle established in Harlow v. Fitzgerald has provided the public servant with the right to assert the defense of qualified immunity. The officialcapacity conduct is different。 it is the act of an agent representing the principal. The public servant, as an agent, carries out the official edict of the government he represents. To the extent that the edict has caused a constitutional tort, the tortious conduct will be imputed to the entity that issued it, although under some circumstances the public servant who implemented it may also be held liable. In Kentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court made this distinction sharply in the context of damages law suits. Personalcapacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Officialcapacity suits, in contrast, generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an officialcapacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only against the official‟s personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an officialcapacity suit must look to the government entity itself. Distinction between officialcapacity and personalcapacity conduct An examination of 167。 1983 lawsuits shows that the plainants routinely name defendant officials in their personal, as well as official capacities. By naming public servants in their personal, as well as official capacity, plainants seek damages against their defendant public servants not only in their personal capacity but also against the municipality that they represent. Case law has been established that a suit against a public servant in his official capacity is essentially the same as a suit against his governmental employer of which he is an agent. Since an officialcapacity suit is not a suit against the person but against the office, one may inherit the suit filed against his predecessor, and a local governmental entity may not escape liability just because the tenant in the office has changed. The distinction between the conduct of official capacity and of personal capacity is a tricky business at times. Hafer v. Melo presented such a challenge. Several former employees in Pennsylvania‟s State Auditor‟s Office sued Barbara Hafer, the newly elected state aud。