国际政治相关外文资料翻译(编辑修改稿)

国际政治相关外文资料翻译(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

deals mainly with two basic prerequisites of successful prevention: information and the ability to act on it. The mission argues that, but for the deficits existing on both counts, could have been prevented. Describing the organization and the operation of Al Qaeda, and reconstructing step by step what in the end led to the attacks, the mission has identified a number of points where timely intervention might have incapacitated Al Qaeda, or could at least have prevented these specific attacks. The mission enumerates ‘‘late leads’’ that were not pursued, and lists actions by the CIA and FBI that might have made a difference but were not undertaken (National Commission 2020, 266–277,355–356). At least two of the hijackers who had previously been identified as possible terrorists could, for instance, have been held for immigration violations, had they only been found in the . ‘‘In sum, the domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat. They did not have direction, and they did not have a plan to institute. The borders were not hardened. Transportation systems were not surveillance was not targeted against a domestic threat. State and local law enforcement were not marshaled to augment the FBI’s efforts. The public was not warned.’’ (Ibid, 265) These failures, so the Commission maintains, were largely the result of insufficient information and insufficient action capabilities, which in turn followed from the structure of what one could call the security munity, from organizational features of the agencies involved, and from a faulty allocation of funds. Underlying this diagnosis of failure we can recognize a simple control model whose structure is similar to the basic threestep model of a policy process, moving from problem definition (., information) via policy choice to policy implementation (., action). This basic model must be disaggregated (or differentiated), and specified for the particular kind of control task. Only then will it be 济南大学毕业 论文外文资料翻译 4 possible to pinpoint conditions for the control of a terrorist work. Let us begin by analyzing the charge of the in more detail. With respect to information, in the eyes of the mission the main cause of failure was not its absolute lack, but the way it was, or rather was not, processed. The organization Al Qaeda as such was known from the time when the . helped to finance the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan。 information on its goal and strategy had been supplied by Bin Laden himself. But it seems that there existed only little useful uptodate information on the structure and action plans of Al Qaeda. Such information might be obtained from the interrogation of detainees, or from ‘‘moles’’ (‘‘assets’’) within, or close, to Al Qaeda. But in the case of , the capability of the . to use such sources was obviously underdeveloped. The FBI lacked Arabspeaking officers who might have served as undercover agents, and there were not even enough petent translators, so that a huge backlog of untranslated intercepts in Arabic built up (Ibid. 77). To collect information that first permits us to identify the existence of an enemy, and subsequently to convert a perceived general threat into a specific threat that could be addressed by more pointed measures, is an obvious precondition of successful c。