利润及其操纵外文翻译(编辑修改稿)

利润及其操纵外文翻译(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

costs in order to protect units from external criticism and to protect reputation. The organization of such protection was an imaginative task for the accounting staff. Lastly, another factor which explains profit manipulation: the result of these case studies indicates that the interdependence of forecasts at different levels when forecasts have been made by disaggregating may encourage managers to take a series of defensive positions and make the information and reporting systems opaque. How much profit manipulation takes place does not only depend on how accounting is used to evaluate the performance of managers and their pay but also how forecasts are made that will be used as a baseline for such performance appraisal. Thus, the remuneration hypothesis put forward in the Positive Accounting Theory does not suffice to explain internal profit manipulation. The agency model in a French context Profit manipulation performed by management controllers must be put in perspective. The AngloSaxon model of corporate governance is consistent with a specific cultural context, and lends factual data, and therefore accounts, a special status. Indeed, the American approach to collecting and handling factual data is intimately tied to the American way of life. Judicial or quasijudicial procedures, which are held in high esteem, give fundamental value to material proof. The way data is collected and used reflects the American preference for accounts that everyone should render public. Accounting statements correspond perfectly to this way of thinking. The French distinguish two roles factual data is likely to play: enabling us to understand better how things work。 and providing a means of assessing people. In the French system, confusing these two roles (which is perfectly legitimate in the United States) generates resistance. The controller’s sense of responsibility alone (meaning what he feels responsible for, and not what he needs to account for) makes him pay attention to information he receives. The French model hardly encourages us to judge each person on the basis of such data and is opposed to superiors demanding accounts that are too stringent. That subordinates may protect themselves from all hierarchical “interference” by surrounding their activity in a shroud of opacity is not considered an illegitimate act. As a consequence, it is the legitimacy of accounts that lies at the heart of the debate in a French context. In general, accounts can be seen as perfectly legitimate by an individual, when they are only seen as signals enabling him to see clearly the direct and indirect consequences of his actions, leaving him room to draw his own conclusions. Such an approach seems well adapted to the way one’s sense of duty is expressed in French society. It is expected that accounts would encourage stakeholders in their actions to take into account what a narrowminded or shortterm vision of their responsibilities would lead them to neglect. In the AngloSaxon model of governance, accounts are part of a conception, which pletely opposes what would most likely be accepted in France. Designed as strictly financial instruments and shortterm assessment criteria, they lose all legitimacy. Since factual data in France has no sacred value, changing or inventing it does not constitute a major transgression. From that point on, manipulating accounts seems to be an ethical practice, almost natural, an act so anchored in everyday values that individuals may not even be aware of it. The relevance of Positive Accounting Theory Positive Accounting Theory, which studies accounting choices, has been overly interested in earnings management. Despite this attention, acad。