内部治理结构与盈余管理外文翻译(编辑修改稿)

内部治理结构与盈余管理外文翻译(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

eetal.,2020。 Klein,2020a). The examination of the association between internal governance structures and the practice of earnings management in Australian firms is motivated by several factors. With The Exception of Peasnell et al.(2020),which uses data,existing research is predominantly US based. Therefore,we explore whether the internal governanceearnings management relationship holds in an institutional environmen where corporate governance is less regulated and choice of governance mechanisms is voluntary(VonNessen,2020). In Australia,at the time of the present study(2020),listed panies were not required to have an audit mittee or an internal audit function. Furthermore,corporate regulators favour principlesbased approach to governance rather than a rulesbased approach(ASX,2020). Although a similar approach exists in the UK,Peasnelletal.(2020)examine only the relationships between earnings management and the proportion of outside directors on the board and the existence of an audit mittee. We extend this research by exploring the effect of additional audit mittee variables such as size and frequency of meetings as well as the independence of members. We also extend board independence to examine whether the separation of the chief executive and board chair roles is associated with earnings management. A further contribution is the inclusion of internal audit as a governance mechanism that is likely to be associated with a reduction in the level of earnings management. While there has been increasing emphasis on the role played in governance by internal audit,no prior earnings management studies have included this variable. Australia is an ideal setting to examine this issue as evidence suggests that many listed panies in Australia do not have an internal audit function. Goodwin and Kent(2020)report that the use of internal audit is associated with the size of the pany and its mitment to strong corporate governance and risk management. Our principal tests,using absolute discretionary accruals to measure earnings management,suggest that a lower level of earnings management is associated with the presence of nonexecutive directors on the board. We also find a negative association between earnings management and audit mittees prising a majority of non executives,but no relationship between earnings management and mittees prised solely of nonexecutives. Our results do not support a relationship between earnings management and the use of internal auditor the choice of a Big 5 auditor. Additional testing,using small positive changes in earnings as an indication of earnings management,suggests that audit mittees are associated with this measure of earnings results have important practical implications because of the heightened interest in corporate governance matters from governments,regulators and standard setters. The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 provides the theoretical background for the study and develops the 3 outlines the research method used to test the hypotheses. It also discusses the measurement of earnings management through the estimation of discretionary 4 reports the present study39。 s results. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications of the research findings,highlighting potential limitations and considering future areas for research. 2 Theoretical background and hypotheses Management The preparation and disclosure of true and fair financial information is central to corporate governance,as it provides stakeholders with a foundation to exercise their rights,in order to protect their interests(OECD,1999). However,earnings management,defined as the practice of distorting the true financial performance of (a) pany39。 (SEC,1999,),effectively weakens this monitoring mechanism as it might conceal poor underlying performance. The published literature has developed and empirically tested a variety of motivations for earnings management to occur(Fields etal.,2020). These fall broadly within the categories of agency costs,information asymmetries and externalities affecting noncontracting parties. However,we are primarily concerned with the extent to which certain corporate governance attributes limit the opportunity to manage earnings,rather than specific incentives for earnings management to occur. Although we attempt to control for two widely documented motives for earnings management。 namely,avoiding breaching debt covenants(DefondandJiambalvo,1991,1994) and avoiding political costs(WattsandZimmerman,1978。 Jones,1991。 Jiambalvo,1996), our approach is to examine a board crosssection of firms rather than identifying a specific subset with strong incentives to engage in earnings management. Such subsets of firms are often context specific(. recent managerial change,hostile takeover or new capital raising)and these contexts are likely to be endogenous to the internal governance mechanisms we examine. Internal governance structure The internal governance structure of a firm consists of the functions and processes established to oversee and influence the actions of the firm’s management. The role of these mechanisms in relation to financial reporting is to ensure pliance with mandated reporting requirements and to maintain the credibility of a firm’s financial statements(Dechow et al.,1995).The mechanisms that we examine in the present study are the board of directors,the audit mittee,the internal audit function and the choice of external auditor. Board of directors Fama and Jensen(1983a,b)recognize the board as the most important control mechanism available because it forms the apex of a firm’s internal governance terms of monitoring financial discretion,an effective board of directors should ascertain the validity of the accounting choices made by management and the financial implications of su。