公共环境外文翻译----当地环境的控制与公共机构的挤出效应-环境工程(编辑修改稿)

公共环境外文翻译----当地环境的控制与公共机构的挤出效应-环境工程(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

estly enforced governmentimposed regulation that standard theory would predict to be welfareimproving. The reason for this mystifying result appears to be that when subjects were confronted with a regulatory constraint on their behavior, they tended, on average, toward purely selfinterested behavior (that is, toward pure Nash strategies), while in the absence of regulatory control their choices were significantly more grouporiented We are by no means the first to suggest that institutions designed and expected to do good might actually engender contrary behavior. A number of authors have suggested that paying a moary reward to motivate socially desirable behavior may actually do the opposite because it may crowd out an individual’s sense of publicspiritedness. Tim (1971) suggested that individuals donate blood more willingly when they do so purely voluntarily than when they are offered money for their donations. In the environmental arena, Frey and OberholzerGee (1997) found that Swiss residents were willing to accept nuclear waste disposal in their munity purely out of a sense of public spiritedness about twice as frequently as when they were offered pensation for accepting the negative externality. Kunreuther and Easterling (1990) found a similar phenomenon in Nevada。 raising tax rebates failed to engender support for sitting a nuclear waste facility at Yucca Mountain near Las Vegas. Evidence that regulatory institutions may crowd out public motivations in favor of greater selfinterest is not limited to the effects of moary incentives. Ostman (1998) suggests that external control of mon pool resources may have a negative effect by shifting responsibility to the regulatory agency and essentially absolving individuals from otherregarding moral obligations. Frolich and Oppenheimer (1998) designed a series of experiments to operationalize John Rawls’ (1971) “veil of ignorance” in the context of private contributions to a pure public good. In addition to a standard contribution Ⅲ 6 game, subjects played a game in which their payoffs resulted from a random reassignment of individual payoffs. This veil over the link between individual choices and payoffs forced subjects to consider the consequences of their choices on the payoffs of the rest of their group. Indeed, the game was designed so that randomizing the assignment of payoffs generated a dominant strategy to contribute the efficient amount to the public good. As predicted, subjects did contribute significantly more to the public good than under the standard treatment. However, and this seems to us to be their most important finding, they also found strong evidence that the institution of random payoffs shifted individual motivations toward greater selfinterest despite the fact that the institution was designed to force a stronger grouporientation. Put simply, the institution served its intended purpose, but it seemed to crowd out otherregarding preferences. We are interested in examining the effects of external institutions (rules and regulations imposed from outside a munity) on behavior in an experimental setting, in particular the effects of external control of environmental quality in rural settings of the。