会计学外文翻译--大股东异质性影响公司的会计质量和信息不对称-会计审计(编辑修改稿)

会计学外文翻译--大股东异质性影响公司的会计质量和信息不对称-会计审计(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

slators and regulators, academics are also interested in the role of large shareholders in firms39。 corporate affairs. Most recently, academics have devoted significant attention to the role of large shareholders with respects to firms39。 corporate decision making. This literature generally portrays large shareholders as being in a unique position to monitor managers and influence operating decisions due to their large equity investment. Theories suggest that large shareholders accumulate blocks in firms for shared control and private control benefits (Holderness, 2020。 Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The benefits of shared control refer to the benefits of increased firm value that all shareholders may gain from large shareholder monitoring efforts, while private control benefits suggest that large shareholders are able to extract benefits due to their influential ownership position. Recent studies have begun to recognize that not all large shareholders have similar monitoring skills and abilities. For example, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2020) analyze the effects of heterogeneity across blockholders and find significant and economically important differences in firms39。 investment, financial, and executive pensation policies among different types of blockholders. In addition, many studies over the last 10 years have focused on the activities of shareholder activists. The shareholder activist literature suggests that target firms have lower Tobin39。 s Q, lower sales growth rates, lower payout ratios, and lower dividend yields than nontargets. Most studies find positive abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of shareholder activist block purchases and also longrun positive abnormal returns over the first year of the block purchase. Despite the pelling evidence from the finance literature suggesting that corporate decisions vary by the types of large shareholders present in a firm and myriad evidence of shareholder activism, much of the extant accounting literature has generally treated large shareholders as a homogeneous group of investors with similar monitoring capabilities. I seek to further this research and provide evidence on how the heterogeneity of large shareholder ownership relates to firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. I begin my examination by constructing three alternative specifications of large shareholder heterogeneity (LSH) based on the type, size, and monitoring aggressiveness of the large shareholders present in a firm. Next, I test whether these measures of LSH are significant determinants of firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. I conclude with an examination of the consequences of new block formations on firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. Applying the three measures of ownership heterogeneity, I first examine whether LSH helps to explain the variation in firms’ accounting quality. I measure accounting quality using two accrualbased metrics. The two accrualbased models are the discretionary accrual model developed by Jones (1991) as implemented by Tucker and Zarowin (2020), and the accrual quality model from Dechow and Dichev (2020) as modified by McNichols (2020). Next, I examine whether LSH is related to marketbased measures of firms’ informa。