会计学外文文献及翻译----问责资产减值的决定-会计审计(编辑修改稿)

会计学外文文献及翻译----问责资产减值的决定-会计审计(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

As explained by Flay, the model is a threedimensional representation of how the behavior of a system can change. The top surface of the model (labeled the “Behavior or Response Surface”) represents the system’s response to changes in inputs known as normal factors. The back edge of the response surface is smooth and illustrates a continuous, linear change in behavior in response to changes in the normal example, as the normal factor changes (represented by movements to the left or right in the model),the behavior of the system changes in linear fashion (represented by movements up or down along the vertical axis). In contrast, the front edge of the surface has a fold or inaccessible region, which illustrates a discontinuous, abrupt change in behavior in response to smooth changes in the normal factor. The factor which determines where on the response surface the system will operate is known as the splitting factor. Changes in the level of the splitting factor are represented by movements from the back of the model to the front and vice versa. Thus, as the level of the splitting factor increases (represented by movement toward the front of the model), the system’s responses will bee more abrupt and discontinuous. By incorporating normal factors and splitting factors, the cusp catastrophe model can be used to explain changes in attitudes and behavior that are primarily linear in nature as well as changes that exhibit varying degrees of hystersis (., stickiness). For example, a normal control variable for an investment behavior might be the favorability of information about the project or investment. As the information about the project bees more unfavorable (., negative consequences are being incurred), one would expect the mitment of resources to the project (., the behavior) to decrease linearly in response to the greater unfavorability of the information. In this happens, changes in behavior are dependent on the magnitude of the normal factor, and those changes occur in a continuous fashion. However, observed behaviors do not always conform to this expectation. According to the cusp catastrophe model, the reason why such changes i n behavior are not always observed is that splitting factors can cause a bifurcation (or discontinuity) in behavior. An example of a splitting factor for an investment decision might be the degree of responsibility felt by the individual for any negative consequences resulting from past investment decisions (as in the escalation of mitment phenomenon). As the magnitude of the splitting factor increases (., as the degree of personal responsibility increases), hystersis in the behavior results. This hystersis causes the individual to remain mitted to the previously chosen course of action. Only when unfavorable information is consistently received and, therefore, bees overwhelming, will the individual change his or her mitment to that action. Furthermore, when change does occur, the change may be catastrophic with a shift to a contrasting position. In terms of the model, the change occurs abruptly because hystersis creates a region of inaccessibility in the behavior. Thus, catastrophe theory would predict that, even in the face of negative consequences, an individual with a high degree of personal responsibility for the original investment will remain mitted to the investment. In fact, the individual may remain very mitted to the investment,even to the point of escalating that mitment. Thus, catastrophe theory may provide an explanation for the divergent evaluations of managerial decisions in Brown and Solomon (1987) and the differences in loan evaluations in Jeffrey (1992).Zeeman (1977) first suggested that the strength of one39。 s opinion on an issue would be controlled by a normal factor, bias, and by a splitting factor, involvement. Based on this suggestion, it is not surprising that differing levels of involvement were associated with differing evaluations in each of these studies. Drawing on the Zeeman39。 s suggestion as well as related work in the social sciences (., Gottman, 1993。 Tesser amp。 Achee, 1994。 Guastello, 1984。 Sheridan, 1985。 Sheridan amp。 Ableson, 1983。 Guastello, 1988。 and Cobb, 1981), Latane and Nowak (1994) proposed the Catastrophe Theory of Attitudes (CTA). The CTA model is a version of the cusp catastrophe model previously described. The normal factor in the CTA model is the positivity/negativity of the information one has about an issue, and the splitting factor is the importance of the issue to the person or the person’s involvement with the issue. The model works in the same manner as the cusp catastrophe model. If a person is not involved with an 105 issue, changes in the person’s attitude toward the issue can be modeled as shown in the back edge of the model. That is, the person’s attitude will change in a linear fashion in response to changes in the positivity/negativity of information the person has about the issue. As the person bees more involved with the issue, changes in the person’s attitude will begin to exhibit discontinuity. Furthermore, when the person has a very high degree of involvement in the issue, any change in the person’s attitude about the issue will likely be catastrophic. For example, a person highly involved with the abortion issue may change abruptly from a prolife to prochoice position when the information supporting the prochoice position bees overwhelming. Referring to the model, Latane and Nowak state the following: With increasing involvement, a cusp develops such that even with information of intermediate positivity, people will tend to have either very positive or very negative attitudes. There is increasing mitment to one39。 s position such that one resists change in response to new information, but at some point, consistently favorable or unfav。