会计信息质量外文文献及翻译--会计信息质量在投资中的决策作用对私人信息和监测的影响节选(编辑修改稿)

会计信息质量外文文献及翻译--会计信息质量在投资中的决策作用对私人信息和监测的影响节选(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

hey find that accounting quality influences investment efficiency in the United States, but not in Japan. They suggest that one potential explanation for this crosscountry difference is the mix of debt and equity in the capital structures of . versus Japanese firms. We extend this research by examining how different sources of financing affect the importance of accounting quality on firms’ investment–cash flow sensitivity. Directly testing how different sources of financing influence the effect of accounting quality on the investment–cash flow sensitivity is challenging because a parison of firms that recently obtained debt financing to those that did not could be affected by their ability to obtain alleviate this problem, we restrict our sample to firms that have all recently obtained debt financing and exploit the differences in access to private information and monitoring that exist across the public debt to private lending continuum as suggested by Diamond We acknowledge that the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows may be lower immediately after obtaining debt financing. However, this possibility would bias against rejecting our hypotheses. Specifically, we identify a sample of 1,163 firms on the Securities Datacorp (SDC) database that have recently raised capital through the issuance of either public debt or syndicated bank debt. We restrict our sample to firms that have recently obtained debt financing to hold constant the firm characteristics associated with borrowing. However, within the sample of firms that have recently obtained debt financing, there are likely to be significant differences in the capital provider’s access to private information and the constraints they place on managerial actions. Diamond’s (1991) theory implies that public debt holders have less access to private information and are thus less effective in monitoring borrowers than banks. Based on these arguments, we predict that accounting quality should have a larger influence on firms’ investment–cash flow sensitivity for firms with public debt than for those with bank debt. Second, we expect that the effect of accounting quality on firms’ investment policies will depend on whether lenders contractually restrict investment. We predict that, when firms face contractual restrictions on investments, overinvestment problems are partially addressed, and accounting quality bees less valuable and less likely to affect the investment–cash flow sensitivity. To provide evidence on these hypotheses, we estimate a model of investments on internal cash flows separately for the sample of firms that only issue public debt and for the sample of firms that issue syndicated loans. In these regressions, we interact the cash flow variable with our measure of accounting quality to investigate whether accounting quality influences investment–cash flow sensitivities. For the bank sample, we further interact the product of the cash flow and accounting quality variables with the investment restrictions variables to examine whether capital expenditure covenants affect the investme nt–cash flow sensitivity. We use both ordinary least squares (OLS) and endogenous switching model estimation to address potential sample selection bias arising from the public versus bank debt financing choice. Our firststage model of the determinants to enter the public versus private debt market follows Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder estimate secondstage ‘‘regime’’ investment model regressions separately for firms that have public versus private debt. These regime regressions also control for endogeneity in the capital expenditure covenant choice using the fitted values from a firststage regression model of the determinants of including an investment restriction in the debt contract. Consistent with prior research, we find that investment is sensitive to internal cash flows and the investment–cash flow sensitivity is lower for firms with higher accounting quality. These results hold in both our OLS and endogenous switching model regressions. We also find that, for both estimation techniques, investment restrictions reduce the investment–cash flow sensitivity and reduce the importance of accounting quality. In this analysis using the overall sample, we do not find a relationship between the type of lender providing capital and the effect of accounting quality on the investment–cash flow sensitivity. In a series of sensitivity analyses, we also consider the possibility that the investment–cash flow sensitivity captures information not only about financing constraints but also about firms’ investment opportunities. To address this concern, we examine the effect of sources of financing on investment–cash flow sensitivities for financially constrained firms versus unconstrained firms. To identify financially constrained firms we use an ex ante definition of financial constraint based on the Whited and Wu 2020 index. We expect that the investments of financially constrained firms, who have greater information asymmetry problems, will depend more on internally generated funds. Similarly, investment–cash flow sensitivities for financially constrained firms will depend more on the quality of accounting information, the existence of private information, and the use of contractual investment restrictions. Consistent with these conjectures, we find that, for financially constrained firms, accounting quality is less important in reducing investment–cash flow sensitivities in the presence of private information. These results support the hypothesis that private information and accounting quality serve as substitutes. This result is also consistent with the notion that access to private information is more important when information asymmetry problems are likely to be high.. In a second。