财务管理-责任代理模式-中英对照(ppt29)-财务综合(编辑修改稿)

财务管理-责任代理模式-中英对照(ppt29)-财务综合(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

ities and payoffs for 4 different events S1= S2= S3= S4= E1=6 $55,000 $55,000 $55,000 $40,000 E2=5 $55,000 $55,000 $40,000 $40,000 E3=4 $55,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 Dr. ChakTong Chau Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials 15 Examples of the Principalagent Model Agent’s Utility Function: Xa189。 e2  100 where: Xa = agent’s pensations e = the effort level used by the agent Question 1: If you were the principal in entering the contract, which level of effort (e1, e2, or e3) would you demand? Question 2: If you, the principal, can closely monitor and observe the agent at all time, what are the amount and condition of payment? And, what is the expected payoff for the principal? Dr. ChakTong Chau Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials 16 Now, let’s assume that you cannot monitor and observe the agent directly. What would you, as the agent, do? Now, can you see the agency problems here? Effort level Expected utility of the agent E1=6 18,496189。 62 = 100 E2=5 18,496189。 52 = 111 E3=4 18,496189。 42 = 112 Is it likely to have the “adverse selection” problem? How about the “moral hazard” problem? And, the horizon problem? Residual loss? Dr. ChakTong Chau Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials 17 What can we say, up to this point?  Under condition of unobservability (inplete information), fixed payments to agents (. workers, employees) most likely do not work.  What are then the alternatives?  We can give the principal a fixed payment instead.  Or, we can e up with an “incentive patible” conditional contract. Dr. ChakTong Chau Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials 18 Fixed Payment to the Principal Consider this new contract under which the principal gets $32,750 no matter what happens and the agent keeps the rest. Will this work? Effort level Expected payoff to the agent E1=6 [(55,000189。 +40,000189。 )32,750]36= E2=5 [(55,000189。 +40,000189。 )32,750]25= E3=4 [(55,000189。 +40,000189。 )32,750]16= Dr. ChakTong Chau Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials 19 Fixed Payment to the Principal  Thus, numerically this will work to ensure that the agent gives the highest effort.。