pricingwithmarketpower(编辑修改稿)

pricingwithmarketpower(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

rmine P* and T*.  Must consider the tradeoff between the entry fee T* and the use fee P*. Low entry fee: High sales and falling profit with lower price and more entrants. Chapter 11 Slide 53 The TwoPart Tariff  The TwoPart Tariff With Many Different Consumers  To find optimum bination, choose several binations of P,T.  Choose the bination that maximizes profit. Chapter 11 Slide 54 TwoPart Tariff with Many Different Consumers T Profit a:entry fee s :sales Tota lT* Total profit is the sum of the profit from the entry fee and the profit from sales. Both depend on T. e nt r an t snnQMCPTTnsa )()()(Chapter 11 Slide 55 The TwoPart Tariff  Rule of Thumb  Similar demand: Choose P close to MC and high T  Dissimilar demand: Choose high P and low T. Chapter 11 Slide 56 The TwoPart Tariff  TwoPart Tariff With A Twist  Entry price (T) entitles the buyer to a certain number of free units Gillette razors with several blades Amusement parks with some tokens Online with free time Chapter 11 Slide 57 Bundling  Bundling is packaging two or more products to gain a pricing advantage.  Conditions necessary for bundling  Heterogeneous customers  Price discrimination is not possible  Demands must be negatively correlated Chapter 11 Slide 58 Bundling  An example: Leasing “Gone with the Wind” amp。 “Getting Gerties Garter.”  The reservation prices for each theater and movie are: Gone with the Wind Getting Gertie’s Garter Theater A $12,000 $3,000 Theater B $10,000 $4,000 Chapter 11 Slide 59 Bundling  Renting the movies separately would result in each theater paying the lowest reservation price for each movie:  Maximum price Wind = $10,000  Maximum price Gertie = $3,000  Total Revenue = $26,000 Chapter 11 Slide 60 Bundling  If the movies are bundled:  Theater A will pay $15,000 for both  Theater B will pay $14,000 for both  If each were charged the lower of the two prices, total revenue will be $28,000. Chapter 11 Slide 61 Bundling  Negative Correlated: Profitable to Bundle  A pays more for Wind ($12,000) than B ($10,000).  B pays more for Gertie ($4,000) than A ($3,000). Relative Valuations Chapter 11 Slide 62 Bundling  If the demands were positively correlated (Theater A would pay more for both films as shown) bundling would not result in an increase in revenue. Gone with the Wind Getting Gertie’s Garter Theater A $12,000 $4,000 Theater B $10,000 $3,000 Relative Valuations Chapter 11 Slide 63 Bundling  If the movies are bundled:  Theater A will pay $16,000 for both  Theater B will pay $13,000 for both  If each were charged the lower of the two prices, total revenue will be $26,000, the same as by selling the films separately. Chapter 11 Slide 64 Bundling  Bundling Scenario: Two different goods and many consumers  Many consumers with different reservation price binations for two goods Chapter 11 Slide 65 Reservation Prices r2 (reservation price Good 2) r1 (reservation price Good 1) $5 $10 $5 $10 $6 $ $ $ Consumer A Consumer C Consumer B Consumer A is willing to pay up to $ for good 1 and up to $6 for good 2. Chapter 11 Slide 66 Consumption Decisions When Products are Sold Separately r2 r1 P2 II Consumers buy only good 2 2211PRPRP1 Consumers fall into four categories based on their reservation price. I Consumers buy both goods 2211PRPRIII Consumers buy neither good 2211PRPRIV Consumers buy only Good 1 2211PRPRChapter 11 Slide 67 Consumption Decisions When Products are Bundled r2 r1 Consumers buy the bundle when r1 + r2 PB (PB = bundle price). PB = r1 + r2 or r2 = PB r1 Region 1: r PB Region 2: r PB r2 = PB r1 I II Consumers buy bundle (r PB) Consumers do not buy bundle (r PB) Chapter 11 Slide 68  The effectiveness of bundling depends upon the degree of negative correlation between the two demands. Consumption Decisions When Products are Bundled Chapter 11 Slide 69 Reservation Prices r2 r1 P2 P1 If the demands are perfectly positively correlated, the firm will not gain by bundling. It would earn the same profit by selling the goods separately. Chapter 11 Slide 70 Reservation Prices r2 r1 If the demands are perfectly negatively correlated bundling is the ideal strategyall the consumer surplus can be extracted and a higher profit results. Chapter 11 Slide 71 Movie Example r2 r1 Bundling pays due to negative correlation (Wind) (Gertie) 5,000 14,000 10,000 5,000 10,000 12,000 4,000 3,000 B A Chapter 11 Slide 72 Bundling  Mixed Bundling  Selling both as a bundle and separately  Pure Bundling  Selling only a package Chapter 11 Slide 73 Mixed Versus Pure Bundling r2 r1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 C2 = MC2 C2 = 30 Consumer A, for example, has a reservation price for good 1 that is below marginal cost c1. With mixed bundling, consumer A is induced to buy only good 2, while consumer D is induced to buy only good 1, reducing the firm’s cost. A B D C C1 = MC1 C1 = 20 With positive marginal costs, mixed bundling may be more profitable than pure bundling. Chapter 11 Slide 74 Summary  Firms with market power are in an enviable position because they have the potential to earn large profits, but realizing that potential may depend critically on the firm’s pricing strategy.  A pricing strategy aims to enlarge the customer base that the firm can sell to, and capture as much consumer surplus as possible. Chapter 11。