1984年巴菲特财务报告(编辑修改稿)

1984年巴菲特财务报告(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

s as surely as repurchases. 而在參與過這麼多次類似的交易後，我們覺得這種作法對不賣出股份的股東同樣有 利，當一家經營績效良好且財務基礎健全的公司發現自家的股價遠低於其實質價值 時，買回自家股票是保障股東權益最好的方法了。 (Our endorsement of repurchases is limited to those dictated by price/value relationships and does not extend to the greenmail’s repurchase a practice we find odious and repugnant. In these transactions, two parties achieve their personal ends by exploitation of an innocent and unconsulted third party. The players are: (1) the shareholder’s extortionist who, even before the ink on his stock certificate dries, delivers his yourmoneyoryourlife message to managers。 (2) the corporate insiders who quickly seek peace at any price as long as the price is paid by someone else。 and (3) the shareholders whose money is used by (2) to make (1) go away. As the dust settles, the mugging, transient shareholder gives his speech on free enterprise the muggee management gives its speech on the best interests of the pany and the innocent shareholder standing by mutely funds the payoff.) 但必須說明的是，我是指那些基於本益比角度的買回 股份，而不包括那種不道德的 greenmail(在這類交易中，甲乙雙方為自身私利協議剝削不知情的丙方，甲方 是指 職業股東在剛買下股票後，便對公司經營階層發出要錢或是要命的勒索，而乙方 是 指息事寧人的公司經營階層，願意用高價買回，只要這個錢不要是他出的就好，丙方 就這樣被犧牲，別人花錢他來買單，結果公司經營階層還信勢旦旦的說要維持公司 利益，而不知情的股東只能呆呆的被宰還不自知。 The panies in which we have our largest investments have all engaged in significant stock repurhases at times when wide discrepancies existed between price and value. As shareholders, we find this encouraging and rewarding for two important reasons one that is obvious, and one that is subtle and not always understood. The obvious point involves basic arithmetic: major repurchases at prices well below pershare intrinsic business value immediately increase, in a highly significant way, that value. When panies purchase their own stock, they often find it easy to get $2 of present value for $1. Corporate acquisition programs almost never do as well and, in a discouragingly large number of cases, fail to get anything close to $1 of value for each $1 expended. 去年我們幾個投資部位較大的被投資公司只要其價格與價值差異頗大時，都努力買回 自家股份，而對 於身為股東的我們而言，有兩點好處，第一點很明顯，是一個簡單的 數學問題，透過買回公司的股票，等於只要花一塊錢的代價便能夠獲得兩塊錢的價值， 所以每股的實質價值可大大的提高，這比花大錢去購併別人的公司的效果要好得多。 The other benefit of repurchases is less subject to precise measurement but can be fully as important over time. By making repurchases when a pany’s market value is well below its business value, management clearly demonstrates that it is given to actions that enhance the wealth of shareholders, rather than to actions that expand management’s domain but that do nothing for (or even harm) shareholders. Seeing this, shareholders and potential shareholders increase their estimates of future returns from the business. This upward revision, in turn, produces market prices more in line with intrinsic business value. These prices are entirely rational. Investors should pay more for a business that is lodged in the hands of a manager with demonstrated proshareholder leanings than for one in the hands of a selfinterested manager marching to a different drummer. (To make the point extreme, how much would you pay to be a minority shareholder of a pany controlled by Robert Wesco?) 第二點較不明顯，且沒有什麼人知道，實際上也很難去衡量，但時間一長其效果越明 顯，那就是管理當局可透過買回自家的股票來對外宣示其重視股東權益的心而非一昧 地要擴張個人經營事業的版圖，因為後者往往不但對股東沒有幫助，甚至反而有害股 東的利益。 如此一來，原有的股東與有興趣的投資人將會對公司的前景更具信心，而 股價便會向上反應而與其本身的價值更為接近。 相對地那一些成天把維護股東權益的 口號掛在嘴邊，卻對買回自家股票的建議置之不理的人，很難說服大家他不是口是心 非，久而久之，他便會被市場投資人所離棄。 (舉個極端的例子 ，換做是你，會願意花 多少錢成為 Robert Wesco 所掌管公司的小股東 ) The key word is demonstrated. A manager who consistently turns his back on repurchases, when these clearly are in the interests of owners, reveals more than he knows of his motivations. No matter how often or how eloquently he mouths some public relationsinspired phrase such as maximizing shareholder wealth?(this season’s favorite), the market correctly discounts assets lodged with him. His heart is not listening to his mouth and, after a while, neither will the market. 崮中關鍵再明顯也不過，當公司的經理人，擺明了不買回公司股份以捍衛股東權益， 其實就已經透露出其內心的想法，不管他嘴巴說得多好聽，無時無刻不把股東權益極 大化，這類目前最當紅的字眼，根本就是口是心非，而過不了多久，市場終會看穿， 以折價反應其所掌控的資產。 We have prospered in a very major way as have other shareholders by the large share repurchases of GEICO, Washington Post, and General Foods, our three largest holdings. (Exxon, in which we have our fourth largest holding, has also wisely and aggressively repurchased shares but, in this case, we have only recently established our position.) In each of these panies, shareholders have had their interests in outstanding businesses materially enhanced by repurchases made at bargain prices. We feel very fortable owning interests in businesses such as these that offer excellent economics bined with shareholderconscious managements. 最近我們靠前三大持股 GEICO、 General Foods 與華盛頓郵報大量買回自家股票 (艾 克森 我們的第四大持股也積極買回股票，不過由於我們是最近才建立部位，所以影 響不大 )，而大發利市，我們對於投資這種具競爭優勢同時又真正注重股東權益的管理 階層感到相當安心。 The following table shows our 1984 yearend holdings in marketable equities. All numbers exclude the interests attributable to minority shareholders of Wesco and Nebraska Furniture Mart. 下表顯示我們在 1984 年底，主要的投資部位 (所有數字已扣除 Wesco及 NFM 公司的 少數股權部份 ) No. of Shares Cost Market (000s omitted) 690,975 Affiliated Publications, Inc. ....... $ 3,516 $ 32,908 740,400 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 44,416 46,738 3,895,710 Exxon Corporation ................... 173,401 175,307 4,047,191 General Foods Corporation ........... 149,870 226,137 6,850,000 GEICO Corporation ................... 45,713 397,300 2,379,200 Handy amp。 Harman ...................... 27,318 38,662 818,872 Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. 2,570。