1982年巴菲特财务报告(编辑修改稿)

1982年巴菲特财务报告(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

endeavor. The market, like the Lord, helps those who help themselves. But, unlike the Lord, the market does not five those who know not what they do. For the investor, a toohigh purchase price for the stock of an excellent pany can undo the effects of a subsequent decade of favorable business developments. 我們投資股份的作法惟有當我們能夠以合理的 價格買到夠吸引人的企業才行得通，同時也需要溫和的股票市場作配合，然而市場就像老天爺一樣，往往會幫助那些自助的人，但與老天爺不一樣的地方是，祂不會 原諒那些不知道自己在做什麼的人。 對投資人來說，買進的價格太高將抵銷這家績優企業未來十年亮麗的發展所帶來的效應。 Should the stock market advance to considerably higher levels, our ability to utilize capital effectively in partialownership positions will be reduced or eliminated. This will happen periodically: just ten years ago, at the height of the twotier market mania (with highreturnonequity businesses bid to the sky by institutional investors), Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries owned only $18 million in market value of equities, excluding their interest in Blue Chip Stamps. At that time, such equity holdings amounted to about 15% of our insurance pany investments versus the present 80%. There were as many good businesses around in 1972 as in 1982, but the prices the stock market placed upon those businesses in 1972 looked absurd. While high stock prices in the future would make our performance look good temporarily, they would hurt our longterm business prospects rather than help them. We currently are seeing early traces of this problem. 所以當股票市場漲到一定的程度，將使我們有效地運用資金買進股份的能力大打折扣或甚至完全消失。 這種情況會不斷發生，就像在 10 年前當股市到達狂熱的高檔時 (由於高股東權益報酬股被機構投資人捧上天 )， Berkshire 的保險子公司 (不包括 Blue Chip Stamps 股權在內 )僅僅持有 1,800 萬市值的股票，僅佔保險公司投資總額的 15% (相較於現在的 80%)，在 1972 年的當時有跟現在一樣多的好公司，但跟現在比他們當時的股價實在有點離譜。 雖然股價高漲對公司短期帳面表現有所助益，但就長期而言卻反而會影響企業的前景， 而目前我們已觀察到一些蛛絲馬跡再度出現。 LongTerm Corporate Performance 企業長期表現 Our gain in worth during 1982, valuing equities held by our insurance subsidiaries at market value (less capital gain taxes payable if unrealized gains were actually realized) amounted to $208 million. On a beginning worth base of $519 million, the percentage gain was 40%. 1982 年 Berkshire 淨值的成長， (保險子公司持有的股票以市價計，扣除未實現資本利得的潛在稅負 )大約是 2 億 800 萬美金，相較於期初淨值 5 億 1,900 萬，約有 40%的成長。 During the 18year tenure of present management, book value has grown from $ per share to $ per share, or % pounded annually. You can be certain that this percentage will diminish in the future. Geometric progressions eventually fe their own anchors. 在現有經營階層接掌公司的 18 年內，帳面價值由原先的每股 美元成長到現在的每股 美元，約當 %年複合成長率， 可以確定的這個比率在未來將減少，成長終將有其極限。 Berkshire’s economic goal remains to produce a longterm rate of return well above the return achieved by the average large American corporation. Our willingness to purchase either partial or total ownership positions in favorablysituated businesses, coupled with reasonable discipline about the prices we are willing to pay, should give us a good chance of achieving our goal. Berkshire 的經營目標是希望獲得高於一般美國企業的長期投資報酬率，我們願意以合理的價格購買全部或部份具競爭力的企業，相當有助於我們達成上述目標。 Again this year the gain in market valuation of partiallyowned businesses outpaced the gain in underlying economic value of those businesses. For example, $79 million of our $208 million gain is attributable to an increased market price for GEICO. This pany continues to do exceptionally well, and we are more impressed than ever by the strength of GEICO’s basic business idea and by the management skills of Jack Byrne. (Although not found in the catechism of the better business schools, “Let Jack Do It” works fine as a corporate creed for us.) 再一次的我們不具控制權的股份投資其市值成長高於其實質經濟利益的成長，舉例來說，在增加的 2億 800 萬市值當中，有 7,900 萬是來自於由於 GEICO 的貢獻，這家公司持續表現優異，我們一再對該公司經營理念的實踐與經營階層的管理能力感到印象深刻 (雖然不是名校出身，但讓 Jack詴看看的結果，證實我們的眼光並成為我們企業的信念 )。 However, GEICO’s increase in market value during the past two years has been considerably greater than the gain in its intrinsic business value, impressive as the latter has been. We expected such a favorable variation at some point, as the perception of investors converged with business reality. And we look forward to substantial future gains in underlying business value acpanied by irregular, but eventually full, market recognition of such gains. 然而 GEICO 在市值的成長卻遠超過本身實質價值的成長，雖然後者的表現一樣令人印象深刻，而當投資大眾逐漸認清現實狀況時，我們相信市值將會反映其真正價值， Yeartoyear variances, however, cannot consistently be in our favor. Even if our partiallyowned businesses continue to perform well in an economic sense, there will be years when they perform poorly in the market. At such times our worth could shrink significantly. We will not be distressed by such a shrinkage。 if the businesses continue to look attractive and we have cash available, we simply will add to our holdings at even more favorable prices. 當然每年的差異變化不會永遠都對我們有利，就算我們持有部份股權的公司每年都表現很好，也不一定保證其在股市的表現就一定不錯，屆時Berkshire 的淨值便會大幅縮減，但我們並不會因此感到沮喪，如果這家公司一直都是那麼吸引人而我們手頭上剛好又有現金，我們便會逢低再增加持股。 Sources of Reported Earnings 帳面盈餘報告 The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In 1981 and 1982 Berkshire owned about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps which, in turn, owned 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table displays aggregate operating earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire’s share of those earnings. All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions in the line near the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. 下表係顯示 Berkshire 依照各個公司持股比例所列示帳面盈餘的主要來源，而各個公司資本利得損失並不包含在內而是彙總於下表最後「已實現出售證券利得」一欄，雖然本表列示的方式與一般公認會計原則不儘相同，不過最後的損益數字卻是一致的 : 其中 Berkshire擁有 Blue Chips Stamps 60%的股權，而後者又擁有 Wesco 財務公司 80%的股權。 Net Earnings Earnings Before Ine Taxes After Tax Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share 1982 1。