1980年巴菲特财务报告(编辑修改稿)

1980年巴菲特财务报告(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

purchase retained earnings. 當然市值的變化起起伏伏且無法預測，更無法真正量化到底數字是多少，有時一個高 價買進的錯誤，甚至可能把公司往後十幾年盈餘累積的效果都給抵銷掉，但是只要市 場回復理性，市價終究會反映公司累積盈餘的能力，甚至超過買進後累積的盈餘，這 等於是在蛋糕上多得到一點糖霜呢。 In the sixteen years since present management assumed responsibility for Berkshire, book value per share with insuranceheld equities valued at market has increased from $ to $, or % pounded annually. (You’ve done better: the value of the mineral content in the human body pounded at 22% annually during the past decade.) It is encouraging, moreover, to realize that our record was achieved despite many mistakes. The list is too painful and lengthy to detail here. But it clearly shows that a reasonably petitive corporate batting average can be achieved in spite of a lot of managerial strikeouts. 在現有經營階層接掌 Berkshire 的十六年來，公司每股的帳面淨值 (其中保險事業的股 權投資以市價計 )已由原先的 美元成長至 美元，相當於年複合成長率 % (事實上你「本身」作得也不錯，過去十年來人體內所含礦物質成份的價值以年 複合成長率 22%增加 )，值得慶幸的是，雖然我們也犯了不少錯，但還是能達到這樣的 記錄，儘管管理上時常糟到三振，但優異的企業體質仍然可以維持相 當不錯的帄均打 擊率。 Our insurance panies will continue to make large investments in wellrun, favorablysituated, noncontrolled panies that very often will pay out in dividends only small proportions of their earnings. Following this policy, we would expect our longterm returns to continue to exceed the returns derived annually from reported operating earnings. Our confidence in this belief can easily be quantified: if we were to sell the equities that we hold and replace them with longterm taxfree bonds, our reported operating earnings would rise immediately by over $30 million annually. Such a shift tempts us not at all. 我們旗下的保險事業將會持續地把資金投資在一些雖不具控制權但經營良好且保留大 部份盈餘的公司之上，按照這個策略，可預期的長期的投資報酬率將持續大於每年帳 面盈餘的報酬率，而我們對此理念的堅信不移是很容易用數字來說明的，雖然只要我 們願意，把手上的股權投資出清，然後轉進免稅的長期債券，公司每年帳面盈餘馬上 就能淨增加 3,000 萬美金，但我們從來就沒想過要那麼去作。 So much for the good news. 好消息真是不斷。 Results for Owners 股東權益報告 Unfortunately, earnings reported in corporate financial statements are no longer the dominant variable that determines whether there are any real earnings for you, the owner. For only gains in purchasing power represent real earnings on investment. If you (a) forego ten hamburgers to purchase an investment。 (b) receive dividends which, after tax, buy two hamburgers。 and (c) receive, upon sale of your holdings, aftertax proceeds that will buy eight hamburgers, then (d) you have had no real ine from your investment, no matter how much it appreciated in dollars. You may feel richer, but you won’t eat richer. 很不幸的，公司財務報表所記載的盈餘已不再表示就是股東們實際上所賺的，只有當 購買力增加時，才表示投資獲得真正的盈餘。 假設當初你放棄享受十個漢堡以進行投 資，期間公司分配的股利足夠讓你買兩個漢堡，而最後你處分投資後可換八個漢堡， 那麼你會發現事實上不管你拿到是多少錢，你的這項投資實際上並無所得，你可能覺 得更有 錢，但不表示你可以吃的更飽。 High rates of inflation create a tax on capital that makes much corporate investment unwise at least if measured by the criterion of a positive real investment return to owners. This “hurdle rate” the return on equity that must be achieved by a corporation in order to produce any real return for its individual owners has increased dramatically in recent years. The average taxpaying investor is now running up a down escalator whose pace has accelerated to the point where his upward progress is nil. 高通貨膨漲率等於是對投入的資本額外課了一次稅，如此一來可能使得大部份的投資 變得有點愚蠢，而近幾年來這個基本門檻，即企業投資所頇最基本的報酬率以使得整 件投資報酬為正的底限可說是日益提高，每個納 ”稅 ”人就好像是在一個向下滑的電扶 梯上拼命往上跑一樣，最後的結果卻是愈跑愈往後退。 For example, in a world of 12% inflation a business earning 20% on equity (which very few manage consistently to do) and distributing it all to individuals in the 50% bracket is chewing up their real capital, not enhancing it. (Half of the 20% will go for ine tax。 the remaining 10% leaves the owners of the business with only 98% of the purchasing power they possessed at the start of the year even though they have not spent a penny of their “earnings”). The investors in this bracket would actually be better off with a bination of stable prices and corporate earnings on equity capital of only a few per cent. 舉例來說，假設一位投資人的年報酬率為 20%(這已是一般人很難達到的成績了 )而當 年度的通膨為 12%，又若其不幸適用 50% 高所得稅級距，則我們會發現該位投資人 在盈餘全數發放的情形下，其實質報酬率可能是負的，因為這 20%的股利收入有一半 要歸公庫，剩下的 10%全部被通貨膨漲吃光，不夠還要倒貼，這結局可能比在通膨溫 和時投資一家獲利帄庸的公司還不如。 Explicit ine taxes alone, unacpanied by any implicit inflation tax, never can turn a positive corporate return into a negative owner return. (Even if there were 90% personal ine tax rates on both dividends and capital gains, some real ine would be left for the owner at a zero inflation rate.) But the inflation tax is not limited by reported ine. Inflation rates not far from those recently experienced can turn the level of positive returns achieved by a majority of corporations into negative returns for all owners, including those not required to pay explicit taxes. (For example, if inflation reached 16%, owners of the 60% plus of corporate America earning less than this rate of return would be realizing a negative real return even if ine taxes on dividends and capital gains were eliminated.) 假設若只有外在的所得稅負而 無隱性的通貨膨漲稅負，則不論如何，正的投資報酬永 遠不會變成負的 (即使所得稅率高達 90%也一樣 )，但通貨膨漲卻不管公司帳面到底賺 不賺錢，只要像是最近這幾年的通膨，就會使得大部份公司的實質投資報酬由正轉為 負，即使有些公司不必繳所得稅也是一樣，舉例來說，如果通貨膨漲率達到 16%，約 有六成的美國企業股東其投資報酬率變為負值，即使大家都不必繳資本利得與股利所 得稅也一樣。 Of course, the two forms of taxation coexist and interact since explicit taxes are levied on nominal, not real, ine. Thus you pay ine taxes on what would be deficits if returns to stockholders were measured in constant dollars. 當然這兩者租稅是交相存於在現實社會中的，因為外在的課稅係按照名目所得而非實 質所得，所以在支付所得稅後，股東的實質幣質將不增反減。 At present inflation rates, we believe individual owners in medium or high tax brackets (as distinguished from taxfree entities such as pension funds, eleemosynary institutions, e。