1981年巴菲特财务报告(编辑修改稿)

1981年巴菲特财务报告(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

s and a manager we liked very much. However, the price finally demanded, considering alternative uses for the funds involved, would have left our owners worse off than before the purchase. The empire would have been larger, but the citizenry would have been poorer. 今年 (1981 年 )我們幾乎談成一筆大買賣，那家公司與其經營階層都是我們所喜愛的 ， 但就是價錢談不隴，若堅持買下的結果，股東的利益不見得會比買之前更好，整個 Berkshire 帝國版圖可能會變的更大，但人民素質反而會變差。 Although we had no success in 1981, from time to time in the future we will be able to purchase 100% of businesses meeting our standards. Additionally, we expect an occasional offering of a major “nonvoting partnership” as discussed under the Pinkerton’s heading on page 47 of this report. We wele suggestions regarding such panies where we, as a substantial junior partner, can achieve good economic results while furthering the longterm objectives of present owners and managers. 儘管 1981 年我們並沒有成功地談成任何一個個案，但我們預計未來仍能買到 100% 符合我們標準的公司，此外我們也期望能有像後面報告所述 Pinkerton這樣投資大量 不具投票權股權的例子，在身為次要大股東的我們可獲得可觀的經濟利益的同時，亦 能幫助公司原有的經營階層實現其長期的目標。 Currently, we find values most easily obtained through the openmarket purchase of fractional positions in panies with excellent business franchises and petent, honest managements. We never expect to run these panies, but we do expect to profit from them. 我們也發現很容易從市場買到一些由有能力且正直的人所經營的公司股票，而事實上 我們也從未打算自己去經營這些公司，但我們的確想要藉由投資這些公司而獲利。 We expect that undistributed earnings from such panies will produce full value (subject to tax when realized) for Berkshire and its shareholders. If they don’t, we have made mistakes as to either: (1) the management we have elected to join。 (2) the future economics of the business。 or (3) the price we have paid. 而我們也預期這些公司的未分配盈餘 (在扣除所得稅後 )將會 100%回餽給 Berkshire 及其股東，當然若最後沒有，可能是出了以下幾種差錯 (1)我們所選擇的經營階層有問 題 (2)公司的前景有問題 (3)我們付的價格有問題。 We have made plenty of such mistakes both in the purchase of noncontrolling and controlling interests in businesses. Category (2) miscalculations are the most mon. Of course, it is necessary to dig deep into our history to find illustrations of such mistakes sometimes as deep as two or three months back. For example, last year your Chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy future of the aluminum business. Several minor adjustments to that opinion now aggregating approximately 180 degrees have since been required. 而事實上，我們不論在買進具控制權或不具控制權的股權時，皆曾犯了許多錯誤，其 中以第二類誤判的情況最常見，當然要翻開我們投資的歷史才能找得到這樣的案例 (可 能至少要回溯至少二、三個月以上吧 …) ，例如去年本人就曾發表看好鋁業發展的前 景，只是到後來陸續經過些微的調整，最後的結論卻是一百八十度的轉彎。 For personal as well as more objective reasons, however, we generally have been able to correct such mistakes far more quickly in the case of noncontrolled businesses (marketable securities) than in the case of controlled subsidiaries. Lack of control, in effect, often has turned out to be an economic plus. 然而基於個人與客觀的理由，通常我們在改正對不具控制權股票投資的錯誤要比對具 控制權的來得容易許多， 這時候缺少控制權，反而成為一種優勢。 As we mentioned last year, the magnitude of our nonrecorded “ownership” earnings has grown to the point where their total is greater than our reported operating earnings. We expect this situation will continue. In just four ownership positions in this category GEICO Corporation, General Foods Corporation, R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. and The Washington Post Company our share of undistributed and therefore unrecorded earnings probably will total well over $35 million in 1982. The accounting rules that entirely ignore these undistributed earnings diminish the utility of our annual return on equity calculation, or any other single year measure of economic performance. 而就像去年我曾提到的，我們在不具控制權的股權投資依投資比例可分得之未分配盈 餘其規模甚至超越我們公司本身的帳面盈餘，且我們預期這種情況將會持續下去， 1982 年光是其中四家 (GEICO、 General Foods、 及華盛頓郵報 )加起 來就超過 3,500 萬美元，由於會計原則規定，使得我們在計算帳面股東權益報酬與單 一年度獲利表現時，無法將這些未分配盈餘記入。 LongTerm Corporate Performance 企業長期績效表現 In measuring longterm economic performance, equities held by our insurance subsidiaries are valued at market subject to a charge reflecting the amount of taxes that would have to be paid if unrealized gains were actually realized. If we are correct in the premise stressed in the preceding section of this report, our unreported ownership earnings will find their way, irregularly but inevitably, into our worth. To date, this has been the case. 在衡量一家公司長期的績效表現時，我們保險子公司所持有的股票會以市價 (扣除預估 應付所得稅 )，而若我們前面所作的推論正確的話，那些不具控制權的股權其未分配盈 餘，雖然不規則但最後終究會反映在我們公司帳上，至少到目前為止情況確是如此。 An even purer calculation of performance would involve a valuation of bonds and noninsurance held equities at market. However, GAAP accounting does not prescribe this procedure, and the added purity would change results only very slightly. Should any valuation difference widen to significant proportions, as it has at most major insurance panies, we will report its effect to you. 當然嚴格來 說，還必須把債券投資及非保險子公司所持有的股票以市價計算才更準 確，然而 GAAP(一般公認會計原則 )並未如此規定，而且這樣做對我們來說其實影響也 不大，當然若其影響大到一定程度， (就像目前很多保險同業便是如此 )，我一定會向 各位報告。 On a GAAP basis, during the present management’s term of seventeen years, book value has increased from $ per share to $ per share, or % pounded annually. This rate of return number is highly likely to drift downward in future years. We hope, however, that it can be maintained significantly above the rate of return achieved by the average large American corporation. 在 GAAP 的基礎下，公司的帳面價值，自現有經營階層接手的 17 年以來，已從 美元增加到如今的 美元，年複合成長率約為 %，只是這個比率在未來將 會逐年下滑，但我們期望它至少能夠高於一般美國大企業的平均水準。 Over half of the large gain in Berkshire’s worth during 1981 it totaled $124 million, or about 31% resulted from the market performance of a single investment, GEICO Corporation. In aggregate, our market gain from securities during the year co。