平狄克微观经济学pricingwithmarketpower(编辑修改稿)

平狄克微观经济学pricingwithmarketpower(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

prices at different points in time Initial release of a product, the demand is inelastic  Hard back vs. paperback book  New release movie  Technology 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 38 Intertemporal Price Discrimination Once this market has yielded a maximum profit, firms lower the price to appeal to a general market with a more elastic demand This can be seen graphically looking at two different groups of consumers – one willing to buy right now and one willing to wait 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 39 Intertemporal Price Discrimination Quantity AC = MC $/Q Over time, demand bees more elastic and price is reduced to appeal to the mass market. MR2 D2 = AR2 Q2 P2 D1 = AR1 MR1 P1 Q1 Initially, demand is less elastic, resulting in a price of P1 . 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 40 Other Types of Price Discrimination PeakLoad Pricing Practice of charging higher prices during peak periods when capacity constraints cause marginal costs to be higher Demand for some products may peak at particular times Rush hour traffic Electricity late summer afternoons Ski resorts on weekends 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 41 PeakLoad Pricing Objective is to increase efficiency by charging customers close to marginal cost Increased MR and MC would indicate a higher price Total surplus is higher because charging close to MC Can measure efficiency gain from peakload pricing 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 42 PeakLoad Pricing With thirddegree price discrimination, the MR for all markets was equal MR is not equal for each market because one market does not impact the other market with peakload pricing Price and sales in each market are independent Ex: electricity, movie theaters 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 43 MR1 D1 = AR1 MC PeakLoad Pricing P1 Q1 Quantity $/Q MR2 D2 = AR2 Q2 P2 MR=MC for each group. Group 1 has higher demand during peak times. 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 44 How to Price a BestSelling Novel How would you arrive at the price for the initial release of the hardbound edition of a book? Hardback and paperback books are ways for the pany to price discriminate How does the pany determine what price to sell the hardback and paperback books for? How does the pany determine when to release the paperback? 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 45 How to Price a BestSelling Novel Company must divide consumers into two groups: Those willing to buy the more expensive hardback Those willing to wait for the paperback Have to be strategic about when to release paperback after hardback Publishers typically wait 12 to 18 months 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 46 How to Price a BestSelling Novel Publishers must use estimates of past books to determine how much to sell a new book for Hard to determine the demand for a NEW book New books are typically sold for about the same price, to take this into account Demand for paperbacks is more elastic so we should expect it to be priced lower 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 47 The TwoPart Tariff  Form of pricing in which consumers are charged both an entry and usage fee Ex: amusement park, golf course, telephone service  A fee is charged upfront for right to use/buy the product  An additional fee is charged for each unit the consumer wishes to consume Pay a fee to play golf and then pay another fee for each game you play 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 48 The TwoPart Tariff Pricing decision is setting the entry fee (T) and the usage fee (P) Choosing the tradeoff between freeentry and highuse prices or highentry and zerouse prices Single Consumer Assume firm knows consumer demand Firm wants to capture as much consumer surplus as possible 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 49 Usage price P* is set equal to MC. Entry price T* is equal to the entire consumer surplus. Firm captures all consumer surplus as profit. T* TwoPart Tariff with a Single Consumer Quantity $/Q MC P* D 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 50 TwoPart Tariff with Two Consumers  Two consumers, but firm can only set one entry fee and one usage fee  Will no longer set usage fee equal to MC Could make entry fee no larger than CS of consumer with smallest demand  Firm should set usage fee above MC  Set entry fee equal to remaining consumer surplus of consumer with smaller demand  Firm needs to know demand curves 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 51 D2 = consumer 2 D1 = consumer 1 Q1 Q2 The price, P*, will be greater than MC. Set T* at the surplus value of D2. TwoPart Tariff with Two Consumers Quantity $/Q MC B C A B Ct w i c e t h a n m o r e  ))((2 21** MCPT A T* 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 52 The TwoPart Tariff with Many Consumers No exact way to determine P* and T* Must consider the tradeoff between the entry fee T* and the use fee P* Low entry fee: more entrants and more profit from sales of item As entry fee bees smaller, number of entrants is larger and profit from entry fee will fall 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 53 The TwoPart Tariff with Many Consumers To find optimum bination, choose several binations of P and T Find bination that maximizes profit Firm’s profit is divided into two ponents Each is a function of entry fee, T assuming a fixed sales price, P 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 54 TwoPart Tariff with Many Different Consumers T Profit a:entry fee s :sales TotalT* Total profit is the sum of the profit from the entry。