平狄克微观经济学marketswithasymmetricinformation(编辑修改稿)

平狄克微观经济学marketswithasymmetricinformation(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

r 17 36 Market Signaling Guarantees and Warranties Signaling to identify high quality and dependability Effective decision tool because the cost of warranties to lowquality producers is too high 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 37 Moral Hazard Moral hazard occurs when the insured party whose actions are unobserved can affect the probability or magnitude of a payment associated with an event If my home is insured, I might be less likely to lock my doors or install a security system Individual may change behavior because of insurance – moral hazard 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 38 Moral Hazard Determining the Premium for Fire Insurance Warehouse worth $100,000 Probability of a fire:  .005 with a $50 fire prevention program  .01 without the program If the insurance pany cannot monitor to see if the program was run, how do they determine premiums? 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 39 Moral Hazard With the program the premium is:  x $100,000 = $500 Once insured owners purchase the insurance, the owners no longer have an incentive to run the program, therefore the probability of loss is $500 premium will lead to a loss because the expected loss is now $1,000 ( x $100,000) 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 40 Moral Hazard Moral hazard is not only a problem for insurance panies, but it alters the ability of markets to allocate resources efficiently Consider the demand (MB) of driving If there is no moral hazard, marginal cost of driving is MC Increasing miles will increase insurance premium and the total cost of driving 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 41 The Effects of Moral Hazard Miles per Week $ 50 Cost per Mile $ $ $ D = MB MC’ (w/moral hazard) With moral hazard insurance, panies cannot measure mileage. MC goes to $ and miles driven increases to 140 miles/week – inefficient allocation. 140 MC (no moral hazard) 100 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 42 Reducing Moral Hazard – Warranties of Animal Health Scenario Livestock buyers want diseasefree animals Asymmetric information exists Many states require warranties Buyers and sellers no longer have an incentive to reduce disease (moral hazard) 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 43 The Principal – Agent Problem Owners cannot pletely monitor their employees – employees are better informed than owners This creates a principalagent problem which arises when agents pursue their own goals, rather than the goals of the principal 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 44 The Principal – Agent Problem Company owners are principals Workers and managers are agents Owners do not have plete knowledge Employees may pursue their own goals even at a cost of reduced profits 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 45 The Principal – Agent Problem The Principal – Agent Problem in Private Enterprises Only 16 of 100 largest corporations have individual family or financial institution ownership exceeding 10% Most large firms are controlled by management Monitoring management is costly (asymmetric information) 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 46 The Principal – Agent Problem – Private Enterprises Managers may pursue their own objectives Growth and larger market share to increase cash flow and therefore perks to the manager Utility from job, from profit, and from respect of peers, power to control corporation, fringe benefits, long job tenure, etc. 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 47 The Principal – Agent Problem – Private Enterprises Limitations to managers’ ability to deviate from objective of owners Stockholders can oust managers Takeover attempts if firm is poorly managed Market for managers who maximize profits – those that perform get paid more so incentive to act for the firm 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 48 The Principal – Agent Problem – Private Enterprises The problem of limited stockholder control shows up in executive pensation Business Week showed that average CEO earned $ million and has continued to increase at a doubledigit rate For the 10 public panies led by the highest paid CEOs, there was negative correlation between CEO pay and pany performance 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 49 CEO Salaries Workers CEOs 1970 $32,522 $ Mil. 1999 $35,864 $ Mil. CEO pensation has gone from 40 times the pay of average worker to over 1000 times 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 50 CEO Salaries Although originally thought that executive pensation reflected reward for talent, recent evidence suggests managers have been able to manipulate boards to extract pensation out of line with economic contribution 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 51 CEO Salaries  How have they been able to do this? 1. Boards don’t typically have necessary information and independence to negotiate effectively 2. Managers have introduced forms of pensation that camouflage the extraction of rents from shareholders  Stock options (not counted as expenses) 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 52 CEO Salaries Rent extraction has increased as consultants are hired to determine appropriate pay for CEO Firm usually wants to provide at least the average of other panies, so salaries have been rising rapidly With publicity increasing, CEO salaries seem to be rising less rapidly 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 53 The Principal – Agent Problem – Public Enterprises Observations Managers’ goals may deviate from the agencies’ goals (size) Oversight is difficult (asymmetric information) Market forces are lacking 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 17 54 The Princ。