平狄克微观经济学externalitiesandpublicgoods(编辑修改稿)

平狄克微观经济学externalitiesandpublicgoods(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

Dollars per unit of reduction Marginal Social Cost Marginal Abatement Cost Observations • MAC = MSC @ .0275 • .0275 is slightly below actual emission level • Economic efficiency improved 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 38 Emissions Trading and Clean Air Bubbles Firm can adjust pollution controls for individual sources of pollutants as long as a total pollutant limit is not exceeded Offsets New emissions must be offset by reducing existing emissions  2020 offsets since 1979 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 39 Emissions Trading and Clean Air Cost of achieving an 85% reduction in hydrocarbon emissions for DuPont Three Options  85% reduction at each source plant (total cost = $ million)  85% reduction at each plant with internal trading (total cost = $ million)  85% reduction at all plants with internal and external trading (total cost = $ million) 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 40 Emissions Trading and Clean Air 1990 Clean Air Act Since 1990, the cost of the permits has fallen from an expected $300 to below $100 Causes of the drop in permit prices More efficient abatement techniques Price of low sulfur coal has fallen 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 41 Price of Tradable Emissions Permits 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 42 Ways of Correcting Market Failure Recycling Households can dispose of glass and other garbage at very low cost The low cost of disposal creates a divergence between the private and the social cost of disposal 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 43 Recycling Marginal private cost likely constant for fixed amount of garbage Social cost of disposal includes the harm to environment from littering and injuries caused by litter Without market intervention, the level of scrap will be at m and m1 m* With refundable deposit, MC increases and MC = MSC = MCR 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 44 The Efficient Amount of Recycling 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 45 Refundable Deposits Deposit is paid when bottle is purchased and then refunded when bottle returned Can choose the deposit to give household incentive to recycle more Deposit increases private cost of disposal Supply of glass es from new glass and recycled glass Increasing deposit increases supply of recycled glass and lowers price of glass 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 46 Refundable Deposits Amount of Glass $ D Price falls to P’ and the amount of recycled glass increases to M*. Sv Sr S The supply of glass is the sum of the supply of virgin glass (SV) and the supply of recycled glass (Sr). M1 P Without refunds the price of glass is P and Sr is M1. S’r S’ P’ M* With refunds Sr increases to S’r and S increases to S’. 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 47 Externalities and Property Rights Property Rights Legal rules describing what people or firms may do with their property For example:  If residents downstream owned the river (clean water) they would control upstream emissions 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 48 Externalities and Property Rights Bargaining and Economic Efficiency Economic efficiency can be achieved without government intervention when the externality affects relatively few parties and when property rights are well specified 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 49 Profits Under Alternative Emissions Choices (Daily) 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 50 Externalities and Property Rights Assumptions Factory pays for the filter Fishermen pay for the treatment plant Efficient Solution Buy the filter and do not build the plant 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 51 Bargaining with Alternative Property Rights 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 52 Externalities and Property Rights Conclusion: Coase Theorem When parties can bargain without cost and to their mutual advantage, the resulting oute will be efficient, regardless of how the property rights are specified 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 53 Costly Bargaining – The Role of Strategic Behavior Bargaining requires clearly defined rules and property rights If property rights were not clear, the other party might not be willing to pay as much and the bargaining process would break down One party might incorrectly assume the other party will eventually break down and accept less Problems also arise when there are many parties affected 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 54 A Legal Solution – Suing for Damages In many situations involving externalities, one party is harmed (victim) They can recover moary damages equal to harm suffered A suit for damages is different than effluent fee since the victim, not the government, is paid 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 55 A Legal Solution – Suing for Damages – Example Fishermen have the right to clean water Factory has two options: No filter, pay damages  Profit = $100 ($500 $400) Filter, no damages  Profit = $300 ($500 $200) 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 56 A Legal Solution – Suing for Damages – Example  Factory has the right to emit effluent  Fishermen have three options: Put in treatment plant  Profit = $200 Filter and pay damages  Profit = $300 ($500 $200) No plant, no filter  Profit = $100  A suit for damages results in an efficient oute 169。 2020 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 18 57 The Coase Theorem at Work Negotiating an Efficient Solution 1987 – New York garbage spill (200 tons) littered New Jersey beaches  The potential cost of liti。