chinesewelfarestateregimes(编辑修改稿)

chinesewelfarestateregimes(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

ge of workers in the textile industry was below twenty (ibid.): The CCP39。 s petition with the KMT to both anize and win over unions in these industries spurred the former to formulate a social policy that was markedly distinguishable from the letter39。 s (Fu, 1993). The CCP sought to anize workers into a class based struggle against capitalists. Part of its anizing platform was the call for a broad based national social welfare system to benefit working people, to be financed through taxation of owners and state expenditure. In contrast, the KMT saw unions as individual units whose purpose was to engage in collective bargaining, based on purely economic issues. It expressly sought to limit Chinese workers39。 militancy and propensity to employ the strike as a weapon against employers (Ibid., 5253). The KMT viewed unionization as a defensive necessity, in light of the threat to its power base from militant munist and socialist anizers。 the word which pops up time and again in party congress declarations on unions is ending (stabilization) of workers39。 lives, and of their politicization as well. The KMT did not advocate a social insurance policy that directly threatened the political or economic hegemony of either national or foreign capital in the workplace. In the end of course, it was the CCP that took over the reigns of political control from the KMT and was left to design a social insurance policy that would meet the imperatives of both its class struggle and national development aims. It did this through the creation of a workplace based iron bowl womb to tomb social insurance system that contributed the most prehensive benefits to workers in the more advanced state and military sectors of the political economy, with lasting ramifications for the social structure to be created in postrevolutionary China. Maoist Social Welfare Policy: 19491979 While clearly the transformation of social relations and social reform were at the heart of the Communists39。 goals in 1949, those goals, while broadly popular ones, were themselves delimited by the reality that China was a Third World country with a very underdeveloped national industry, particularly in the heavy industry sector. The CCP leadership was convinced that in order for China to develop the capacity to be self sufficient and not be dependent on outside capital for development, considerable resources would have to be invested in the sector of heavy industrial production. Hence, even though the CCP would eventually take a distinctly different path from its Stalinist neighbor and develop an alliance with the peasantry through a vigorous land reform, it also recognized that in order to stimulate heavy industry growth, rural surpluses would have to be extracted to feed a new class of a mostly urban based proletariat. For better or worse, social policy had to be designed with these political economic exigencies in mind (Riskin, 1987). Incentives had to be created to induce China39。 s best workers to want to work in the heavy industry sector. One way in which this was acplished was through a social welfare system that granted greater benefits to those workers located in the state sector industries, which were predominantly heavy industry oriented (Davis, 1989。 Walder, 1986, 3974). That is to say, the postrevolutionary social insurance system in China was established to acplish both redistributive and national development oriented objectives. What this translated into was a social insurance system based on the presumption that work was available to all and that the most advanced sector of production (heavy industry) would be the site of the most generous social insurance benefits. The point of establishing a social insurance system was not to ameliorate the maleffects of an economy based on labor markets, as is the case with welfare states under capitalism. Rather, it was foremost intended to redistribute surplus via the state. Szelenyi39。 s research on Hungarian state socialism demonstrates that one of the unintended consequence of redistribution via the mechanism of state bureaucratic allocation was to deliver the finest benefits to party bureaucrats (Szelenyi, 1983). Further, the higher one was in occupational status ranking the greater the noncash allowances allotted (ibid., 86). China would see a similar phenomenon, with greater emphasis on workplace location, along with proximity to the party: In the traditionally planned economy, economic resources, business opportunities, and incentives were all subject to government allocation. Being controlled by the government meant that state anizations had the privilege of retaining these resources, opportunities, and incentives. As a result, collective enterprises, under less government control, received fewer resources, opportunities and incentives (Blah, 1994, 28). That is to say, the postrevolutionary social insurance system in China was established to acplish both redistributive and national development oriented objectives. What this translated into was a social insurance system based on the presumption that work was available to all and that the most advanced sector of production (heavy industry) would be the site of the most generous social insurance benefits. The point of establishing a social insurance system was not to ameliorate the maleffects of an economy based on labor markets, as is the case with welfare states under capitalism. Rather, it was foremost intended to redistribute surplus via the state. Szelenyi39。 s research on Hungarian state socialism demonstrates that one of the unintended consequence of redistribution via the mechanism of state bureaucratic allocation was to deliver the finest benefits to party bureaucrats (Szelenyi, 1983). Further, the higher one was in oc。