analysisofadenialofserviceattackontcp内容摘要:

nd traffic in large backbone works with plex topology 8/17 Solution (3/5)  Connection establishment improvements  Remove requirement of resource allocation  Calculate ISS (initial send sequence) of destination as hash value  Hash value (y : ISS of destination)  Drawback • Require the modification of TCP standard and consequently every TCP implementation Source IP address Destination IP address Port Source’s ISS Destination’s secret key Message H y Second message : SYNy, ACKx+1 Source IP address Destination IP address Port Source’s ISS Destination’s secret key Message H Third message : ACKy+1 y’ pare 9/17 Solution (4/5)  Firewall approach  Firewall as a relay • Receive packets for internal host on its behalf • Drawback  Delay Li A D Firewall SYN SYN+ACK ACK SYN SYN+ACK ACK Data Data Data Data Li A D Firewall SYN SYN+ACK Fig 3. Attacker scenario Fig 4. Legitimate connection Sequence Number conversion 10/17 Solution (5/5)  Firewall approach (cont’d)  Firewall as a semitransparent gateway • Drawback  Waste a large number of illegitimate open connections at the destination if it is under attack Li A D Fir。
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