工程管理毕业设计-招标文件外文翻译中英文：激励机制和奖励办法：竞争性招标在采购与谈判

工程管理毕业设计-招标文件外文翻译中英文：激励机制和奖励办法：竞争性招标在采购与谈判内容摘要：

rs share uncertainty about many important design changes that occur after the contract is signed and production begins. These changes are usually a consequence of design failures, unanticipated conditions, and changes in regulatory requirements. An illustrative example of the significance of ex post adaptation is the building of the Getty Center Art Museum in Los An geles, which is a 24 acre, $1 billion dollar facility that took over 8 years to construct (see Engineering NewRecord 1994, 1997). The project design had to be changed due to site conditions that were hard to anticipate. The geology of the project included canyons, slide planes and earthquake fault lines, which posed numerous challenges for the team of architects and contractors. For instance,contractors “hit a slide” and unexpectedly moved 75,000 cubic yards of earth. More severely, in 1994 an earthquake struck. Cracks in the steel welds of the building’s frame caused the contractors to reassess the adequacy of the seismic design standards that were used. The project design had to be altered also due to the regulatory environment— 107 items had to be added to the building’s conditional use permit. These problems were very hard to predict, both for the procurer and the contractor. However, it seems reasonable that once problems arose, the contractor had superior information regarding the costs and methods to implement changes. A more recent and much more contentious example is the “big dig” in Boston, where 12,000 changes to more than 150 design and construction contracts have led to $ billion in cost overruns, much of which can be traced back to unsatisfactory design and site conditions that diered from expectations. These observations suggest that the procurement problem may indeed be primarily one of smoothing out or circumventing adaptations after the project begins rather than information revelation by the supplier before the project is selected. In this Chapter we argue that the form of contracts and award mechanisms can be tailored in a way to help mitigate this procurement problem. In particular, a trade between 宁波工程学院毕业设计（论文） — 外文翻译 4 incentives to reduce cost and incentives to facilitate changes and share information will be the key force in our arguments of contractual choice. We argue that simple projects, which we define as easy to design with little uncertainty about what needs to be produced, ought to be procured using fixedprice contracts,should be acpanied by high levels of design pleteness (to prevent the need for adaptations), and are best awarded through petitive tendering. In contrast, plex projects, which we define as hard to design with large scope for surprises in the final configuration ought to be procured using costplus contracts, should be acpanied by low levels of design pleteness (implying a high chance that ad。