工程管理毕业设计-招标文件外文翻译中英文：分包和不完全竞争性招标

工程管理毕业设计-招标文件外文翻译中英文：分包和不完全竞争性招标内容摘要：

quantity and below cost on tasks expected to underrun. By skewing, a bidder earns a higher prot without a ecting its total bidand hence probability of winning the contract. Bid skewing is risky. If the overrun (or, for thatmatter underrun) does not occur, the winning bidder suers a lose. The principles for allocating unit price bids are analogous to concepts from modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952). The specic modeling choices match industry practitioners39。 intuition about unit price bidding. They credit these ideas to Gates (1959). I apply results from the scoring auction literature to formallycharacterize equilibrium bidding behavior (Asker and Cantillon, 2020). The model collapses to a linear econometric specication. A unit price bid is the dependent variable and the proxy for inpleteness is the key explanatory variable. There are two potentially confounding factors: bid skewing and the endogeneity of subcontracting decisions. Bidskewing terms derived from the auction model enter linearly. To account for the endogeneity of subcon tracting decisions, I use a xed eect method which exploits the unique panel data structure. I see multiple observations of very similar transactions. For example, within a project there are multiple bidders, and across projects, the same set of construction tasks. Finally, I add exibility by making a distinction between heavy construction tasks and ancillary tasks. The predominant view in the industry is that prime contractors lack core petencies and a minimum e cient scale on ancillary tasks. I will argue 宁波工程学院毕业设计（论文） — 外文翻译 5 that it is ambiguous whether the e ect of inpleteness on subcontracting costs should be hypothesized to be greater than that for primecontracting. (I invent the word primecontracting for a dichotomy with the term subcontracting. Primecontracting means the prime contractor elects to perform work ) Contribution to Existing Literature This study joins an emerging literature that quantities the impact of rm boundaries on economic outes. Recent examples include Gil (2020) (industry: cinemas and performance oute: movie run length), Ciliberto (2020) (hospitals and capital investments), Forbes and Lederman (2020)(airlines and ight delays), and Novak and Stern (2020) (automobiles and consumer quality ratings).Others Baker and Hubbard (2020) (trucking and fuel economy) and Levin and Tadelis (2020)(municipal services and city expenditures)consider but do not focus on performance outes. I adopt a more structural approach than most work in this literature by analyzing an auction setting. The timing of bid submissions provides a crisp division between exante contract formation(design and bid) and expost contract execution (build). This means bids capture all costs of both exanted incentive distortions and expost bargaining. Whereas many of the previous studies consider intermediate outes that partially related to the pro tability objectives of rms, bids fully encapsulate contractors39。 objectives. They choose anizational arrangements that minimi challenge in conducting an performance based make or buy study is to account for endogeneity in subcontracting decisions. The panel data structures provides controls. This study of contractual inpleteness falls into the class of empirical work that considers uncertainty and plexity of a transaction. Seminal contributions include Monteverde and Teece (1982), Masten (1984) and Masten et al. (1991). They nd a higher degree of plexity is associated with a lower probability of subcontracting. Recent work by Gil (2020) (movies), Acemoglu,Aghion, Grith, and Zilibotti (2020) (Ramp。 D intesity), Forbes and Lederman (2020) (airlines) Levinand Tadelis (2020) (municipal services) obtain the same result. The literature on forward integration into retailing nds mixed Williamson (1985) and, in particular, his earlier work Williamson (1975), identied uncertainty as one of the key determinants of rm boundaries for empirical researchers to take to the factor is losing favor, in part, because of the difculty of measuring uncertainty. Typically, studies rely on 宁波工程学院毕业设计（论文） — 外文翻译 6 survey data of industry practitioners or measures of market volatility. Uncertainty is notoriously measured with error. This creates severe attenuation bias that leads to statistically insignicant strength of th。