博弈论资料-英文(25个文件)syllabus-博弈论(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：
(1988): “The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 45, 370391. AUMANN, R. and BRANDENBURGER, A. (1995): “Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 63, 11611180. 5. Putting it All Together: Some Auction Theory First and Secondprice auctions Dominance and Equilibrium analysis with private values The Revenue Equivalence Theorem L O MY Section Rationalizability with Inplete Information Nonequilibrium analysis of auctions Computation! L 6. Extensive Games: Basics Extensive games with perfect information Notation(s) and terminology Nash equilibrium R OR Sections , , Backward Induction and SubgamePerfect equilibrium The OneDeviation Property Extensive games with perfect but inplete information Perfect Bayesian equilibrium R OR Section , up to p. 233 Repeated Games: basics General setup and payoff aggregation criteria Automata Nash Folk theorems for infinitely repeated games. R OR Sections Perfect folk theorems for infinitely repeated games Perfect folk theorems for finitely repeated games R OR Sections 8. Extensive Games: details General Extensive games: imperfect information. Relationship between normal and extensive form. Mixed and Behavioral strategies. Kuhn’s Theorem. Perfect and Imperfect Recall R OR Chapter 11 Sequential rationality and offequilibrium beliefs TremblingHand Perfect。阅读剩余 0%
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