外文翻译-----西方银行公司治理对中国的影响(编辑修改稿)

外文翻译-----西方银行公司治理对中国的影响(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

started branch management and benchmark models. Xian City Bank Training for bank staff on credit analysis Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Supported credit training program in 2020。 advised on acquisition of credit cooperative. China Industrial Bank Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Provided corporate governance technical assistance in 2020。 portfolio stress test in2020。 technical assistance on IT frame work。 SME lending diagnostics and strategy。 supported energy efficiency lending. Asia Pacific Business Review selfinterest and decentralized markets are capable of functioning efficiently and fairly。 the continental European model based on a stakeholder theory of the firm, where the interests of not just shareholders, but of other groups, such as trade unions and work councils, are also considered (Luo 2020). In East Asia there are also a number of distinctive models including the Keiretsu model in Japan (sets of panies with interlocking relationships and shareholdings) (Witt 2020) and the model in South Korea (Governmentsupported global conglomerates such as Samsung) (Sung 2020). Liu(2020) has argued that the corporate governance system in China is one which is ‘control based’, rather than market orientated because China’s unique institutional setting means that the regulators and authorities still make extensive use of administrative measures to control developments in the economy. Cousin (2020) argues that corporate governance in Chinese banks poses a distinctive set of problems which are some what different to those encountered by other Chinese firms. First, the principalagent relations are even more plex because they must take account of a wider range of stakeholders including depositors, lenders, supervisors and regulators(Cao and Zhao 2020). Second because of the importance of the financial system to economic growth and social stability bank failures will not be allowed and in the event of potential collapse they are likely to be saved (Wang and Huang 2020). Of course, recent events in the global economy have shown that this behaviour is not unique to the Chinese system, however the implications of a government guarantee to maintain ‘financial security’ means that internal controls should, in theory, be much stronger than in industries where the threat of collapse is far more real (Cao and Zhao 2020, Wang and Huang 2020). Finally, information asymmetry is deeper in banks than in other panies because quality in financial intermediation cannot be assessed immediately. For example, nonperforming loans tend to be discovered in the future not at the time of issuance (Wei 2020). It is clear that, in the Chinese case, the state has allocated to itself the main role in the banking system and, historically speaking at least, this differentiates Chinese corporate governance models from those found in AngloSaxon countries. Officials argue for the merits of this system on the basis that, at China’s current stage of development, markets would not fairly allocate resources and the government has a responsibility for managing the financial system so that development occurs rapidly, but with stability (Zhou 2020). That there are differences between the AngloSaxon and the Chinese models of corporate governance is hardly surprising. The ‘varieties of capitalism’ research tradition has produced numerous case studies demonstrating that there has been little convergence in terms of governance structures or economic policy making over the last 20 years despite extensive financial global。