金融学专业外文翻译--格莱珉银行的历程-金融财政(编辑修改稿)

金融学专业外文翻译--格莱珉银行的历程-金融财政(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

an increasing amount of Grameen Bank senior management time was devoted to exporting the Grameen Bank model. I first became acquainted with the Grameen model in 1987, while researching rural finance in Sri Lanka. At the time it seemed that almost every NGO and donor project I visited had staff who had recently returned from a visit to the Grameen Bank. Most of these staff were very impressed with what they had seen and talked of ‘replicating’ the model. The Asian Development Bank, desperate to approve loans to Sri Lanka, dressed up its rural finance proposals as building on the Grameen Bank’s success – even though they were not using the Grameen model! The idea of replicating the Grameen Bank around the world crystallised when the US based group RESULTS and its Director, an experienced lobbyist, came up with the idea of a Microcredit Summit. Since 1990, the UN had convened a set of global summits that had set goals for poverty reduction, education, gender equality and other issues. The 1997 Microcredit Summit was not a UN event – it was organised by RESULTS – but it presented as a global summit, with claims of ‘microcredit is a human right’ and speeches from heads of state. It set a goal of mobilising US$ billion, so that 150 million households would be able to access Grameen Banktype loans by 2020. Some within the Microcredit Summit movement pushed for a focus on microfinance and a broader range of services but that did not suit RESULTS’ campaigning style. It needed a simple message. The Grameen Bank was a panacea, the world should replicate it! Can the Grameen Bank go bust? As the Grameen model was ‘exported’ overseas during the 1990s, the Bank continued to grow in Bangladesh. Client numbers grew steadily, but the portfolio grew more quickly as clients took bigger ordinary loans and new types of loans (especially housing). Those of us working in Bangladesh increasingly heard that repayment rates were falling, but that branch managers were massaging their performance figures by issuing new loans to defaulters. These were immediately used to pay off the outstanding loan and hide the problem of nonrepayment. There were also criticisms of the gender achievements of the Bank: did it merely get women to take loans that they gave straight to their husbands? Then, there were criticisms of the idea that Yunus propounded, of every Grameen Bank loan being used for microenterprise, and every microenterprise being fieldwork showed that Grameen Bank clients used their loans for many different purposes – business, food consumption, health, education and even dowry. Grameen loans did not go to microfirms for a single, specific investment。 rather, they went into the plex financial portfolios of lowine households. Longtime researcher on microfinance in Bangladesh, Stuart Rutherford, was one of those able to see what was going on. Grameen Bank clients paid the kisti (weekly repayments) on their loans not from a single microenterprise, but from patching together earnings from casual employment, selfemployment, remittances and a variety of loans from other sources. But, as clients stayed with Grameen Bank, they were under pressure to take bigger, ordinary loans alongside new housing loans. As a result, they took on levels of debt they could not service from their ine. To stop them from defaulting, they were issued with larger loans by Grameen branch managers to repay earlier loans. In Dhaka, rumours circulated of a meeting at which Professor Yunus asked his senior staff to tell him the true level of repayment and the scale of the ‘hole’ in the Bank’s finances. The severe floods of 1998, and the collapse of the Bank’s recently introduced agriculture loans, exacerbated the repayment problem. From Grameen I to Grameen II The problems faced by Grameen Bank in the late 1990s led to its senior staff piloting a number of experiments with new。