金融学专业外文翻译---国际货币和金融安排：现状与未来(编辑修改稿)

金融学专业外文翻译---国际货币和金融安排：现状与未来(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

more independent central bank being responsible (., causing) lower inflation. Unless, however, we believe that laws and institutions are entirely irrelevant and have no effect whatsoever on economic performance (here the rate of inflation) we must conclude that a more independent central bank is more likely, other things equal, to lead to lower inflation than a less independent central bank. As support for central bank independence has increased around the world, so has the tendency to entrust to central banks the sole function of achieving a given inflation target or range. This, however, raises the question of whether it would be more appropriate to entrust the central bank with a target that is more directly controllable by the central bank, such as the growth of a narrow money aggregate, rather than a specific inflation target. Setting an inflation target, however, seems more appropriate today in view of the collapse of the relationship between money growth and inflation in one country after another. As a result, it is better to assign an explicit inflation target to the central bank and provide it with instrument independence to pursue the inflation target. As to why the central bank should be given a specific inflation target rather than a growthofrealGDP or rateofunemployment target, the answer is that inflation is a moary phenomenon while the rate of growth of real GDP and the rate of unemployment are real phenomena. Real phenomena are, of course, affected by moary phenomena, but here the chain of causality depends on policies and institutions that are not under the direct control of the central bank. In giving a specific inflation target to the central bank, it is important to point out that fixed exchange rates are less inflationary than flexible exchange rates. Thus, a country that is trying to move from a high to a low inflation environment would do well to adopt a fixed rather than a variable exchange rate system as a means of anchoring moary policy and market expectations. Many developing countries, however, have been moving toward greater exchangerate flexibility in order to cope better with big swings in foreign capital flows. Although many empirical studies have found a negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation in industrial countries, this is not the case for developing countries. Cukierman (1992) found a positive, not a negative, relationship between central bank independence and inflation for a group of 70 developing countries that he studied over the 1950–1989 period. This, however, may be due to the fact that the central banks of many developing countries are independent legally but not in reality, as evidenced by the fact that they continue to finance government deficits. This has certainly been the case for Mexico and Venezuela. For example, when Venezuela suffered a wave of bank failures in 1994, it decided that the best way to address the problem was to print billions of bolivars and impose capital controls. The same happened in Mexico following the deep financial crisis that started at the end of 1994. . Central bank independence, the real economy, and fiscal deficits Does the lower inflation rate with an independent central bank e at the expense of growth of output for the nation? Alesina and Summers (1993) found no negative correlation between central bank independence and average growth of real GDP or the variability of growth of real GDP for the same 16 industrial countries that they used to examine the relationship between central bank independence and inflation over the 1955–1988 period. Barro (1995) and Sarel (1996) confirm this for inflation rates below 8%. Thus, it does not seem that central banks in industrial nations trade a lower growth rate of output for the sake of a lower rate of inflation. The same conclusion was reached for industrial nations in another study by Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis,。